In Randa Jaafar, M.D. v. New York Spine & Sport Rehabilitation Medicine, P.C., No. 24-CV-6588 (MKV), 2026 WL 2935800 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
[T]he Court focuses only on alleged incidents of sexual harassment or discrimination for which Plaintiff provided at least some modicum of evidentiary support. Those incidents are: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint about pay disparity in 2017 (and no later than November 2017); (2) Dr. Gopal’s rejected sexual advance at his Halloween party in 2018; (3) dispute over pension payments in December 2020; and (4) Plaintiff’s dispute with Dr. Gopal about patient care in November 2021.
As for the first incident, Plaintiff testified that she complained at some point in 2017 about the fact that her male colleagues were paid a higher commission rate despite the fact that she allegedly worked harder than they did and had more credentials, notwithstanding that it is undisputed that they had more years of experience. See Def. 56.1 Reply ¶¶ 10, 12; Pl. Dep. 50:14-51:5; 63:15-24. Of course, Plaintiff comes forward with no evidence as to what the male physicians at NYSSRM were actually paid. In any event, it is undisputed that in 2017 Plaintiff was being paid 50% in commissions, which was reduced to 40% in November 2017 due to “high business expenses and reduced revenue collection.” Def. 56.1 Reply ¶ 6. At the time, Plaintiff replied that she “totally understand[s],” Friedman Decl., Ex. D, a far cry from complaining about her pay or now claiming that there was some sex-based disparity. And critically, Plaintiff concedes that in 2018 she requested that her compensation be changed to commission only at 40%. See Def. 56.1 Reply ¶ 11. Accordingly, it is unclear how any perceived purported disparity in Plaintiff’s pay could have contributed to a hostile work environment given that Plaintiff requested the compensation rate of 40%, which was lower than the rate she was receiving in 2017. Indeed, in her opposition brief, Plaintiff rather tellingly does not even argue that any pay disparity in 2017 contributed to her claimed hostile work environment. Opp’n at 14-15.
As for the second incident, Plaintiff testified that Dr. Gopal offered her as a prize for wining best costume at a Halloween party in 2018 the opportunity to spend the night with him, which she rejected. Def. 56.1 Reply ¶ 39; see also Pl. Dep. 133:4-135:10. The parties characterize this act as a sexual advance. Def. 56.1 Reply ¶ 39. While this conduct is no doubt serious, even if accepted as true, a single sexual advance does not constitute a hostile work environment absent further misconduct. See Mormol, 364 F.3d at 55-59 (affirming grant of summary judgment finding insufficient evidence of hostile work environment where manager twice propositioned plaintiff for sex); Kilgannon v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:20-cv-01891 (MKV), 2021 WL 4523505, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (“the law is clear that mere [sexual] advances, even repeated, will not constitute a hostile work environment absent further misconduct” and collecting cases); Drouillard v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 375 F. Supp. 3d 245, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[P]laintiffs cannot establish a hostile work environment claim based on a single sexual advance by a coworker.”). And here, Plaintiff does not come forward with any evidence that this incident was so severe that she complained about it or that it altered the conditions of her employment. Plaintiff relies on her conclusory deposition testimony that after the 2018 Halloween party her work “became more hostile, more harassment, more comments, and I just progressively made less.” See Def 56.1 Reply ¶ 39 (citing Pl. Dep. 135:17-23). But, as repeatedly discussed throughout this opinion, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of fact to defeat summary judgment. See Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005) (nonmoving party cannot rely merely on “conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation” to defeat summary judgment).
Plaintiff additionally argues that after the Halloween party, over two years later in December 2020, Dr. Gopal threatened litigation because Plaintiff would not let him take money out of her paycheck for pension payments. See Def 56.1 Reply ¶ 39 (citing Pl. Dep. 85:3-14, Friedman Decl., Ex. H). Notwithstanding the lack of any apparent connection between this seemingly isolated dispute over pension and the Halloween Party two years earlier in 2018, the undisputed record shows that Dr. Gopal was making the same pension related deductions from the male physicians in the practice as well. See Def 56.1 Reply ¶ 50-51; see also Rodriguez Decl., Ex. P (Plaintiff testifying in a separate state case brought by Dr. Gopal against her that Dr. Gopal took pension payments from Dr. Elzholz but that she did not let him take those deductions from her). This record evidence directly refutes any inference that the act of taking these deductions was sex-based hostility or connected to her refusal of his advance. Moreover, the record cited by Plaintiff contradicts her claim that Dr. Gopal threatened litigation over the pension issue, but rather that Plaintiff threatened litigation and Dr. Gopal responded that he was not interested in litigating. See Friedman Decl., Ex. H (Plaintiff texting “I will higher [sic] a lawyer to make sure this pension doesn’t get deducted from my pay or to help me refuse it” and Dr. Gopal responding “ha ha you think I have time for that … lets just move on with our lives!”). And just as importantly, Plaintiff testified that while Dr. Gopal was ultimately unsuccessful in taking pension payments from her, he did successfully take the payments from Dr. Elzholz, further undercutting any notion that this issue impacted her conditions of employment, was sex-based discrimination, or contributed to any sex-based hostility in the workplace. Def. 56.1 Reply ¶ 50-51.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that her denial of Dr. Gopal’s sexual advance is also connected to the last and only other incident of supposed harassment: Plaintiff’s text message dispute with Dr. Gopal over patient care on November 4, 2021, which precipitated her notice of resignation on the same day. See Def. 56.1 Reply ¶¶ 39, 46. As discussed, in that text exchange, Dr. Gopal and Plaintiff disagreed over the proper treatment of a patient. Rodriguez Decl., Ex. I. The 2018 Halloween party is not mentioned. Rodriguez Decl., Ex. I. After Plaintiff pushed back on Dr. Gopal’s comment that she should not call a patient a ‘drug addict’ and that she is “giving triggerpoints to peoples in chiropractic offices [sic],” Dr. Gopal further asserted that Plaintiff’s Ivy league education was unimpressive, that she was an “Instagram trigger point chiropractor” not a real doctor, and that she should see a therapist “rather feeling imp [sic] on the likes of an Instagram star public account with the perverted men following.” Rodriguez Decl., Ex. I. Plaintiff latches on to the reference to Instagram as evincing sex-based hostility. See Def. 56.1 Reply ¶ 46 (stating that the 2018 Halloween was not “the only instance Dr. Gopal engaged in sex discrimination” and proceeding to point only to Dr. Gopal making “a discriminatory remark regarding Plaintiff’s Instagram” and quoting the text about “perverted men” following her Instagram account).
Even assuming this exchange reflects sex-based hostility, which is dubious, this harsh toned exchange, even in conjunction with the few other episodes, including Dr. Gopal’s alleged sexual advance that occurred three years earlier, falls well short of the severity and frequency to demonstrate that her workplace was permeated with sex-based discrimination, intimidation, ridicule and insult. See Cristofaro v. Lake Shore Cent. Sch. Dist., 473 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding evidence that supervisor occasionally commented on Plaintiff’s physical appearance, “participated in a bet with three other male employees as to when [he] would be able to engage Cristofaro in sexually explicit conversation” and “briefly made contact with the side of her body while standing next to her” was insufficient to establish hostile work environment); Mormol, 364 F.3d at 57-59 (affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer because two instances of overt sexual solicitation over two months and a subsequent disciplinary write up were “not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment”); Alfano, 294 F.3d at 379-80 (finding insufficient five incidents of sex-based hostility over a four-year period, which included telling plaintiff she ate carrots too seductively as well as placing a vulgar cartoon and carrots in a way representing genitalia in plaintiff’s locker); Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents of offensive conduct (unless extremely serious) will not support a claim of discriminatory harassment.”); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir. 1998) (offensive comment about plaintiff’s buttocks and a deliberate touching of her breasts insufficient to establish a hostile work environment); Kilgannon, 2021 WL 4523505, at *7 (finding that a co-worker’s repeated romantic overtures, comments on physical appearance, and even telling plaintiff she knew where he lived and had a weapon, was insufficient to establish hostile work environment). Further undermining Plaintiff’s claim is the fact that Plaintiff swore under oath in the separate state case between the parties that she primarily resigned, not due to a hostile work environment, but because Defendant lost an insurance contract which impacted Plaintiff’s earnings. See Def. 56.1 Reply ¶ 49.
In sum, the few isolated incidents that Plaintiff complains of that occurred over the span of four years—alleged pay disparity in 2017 that was resolved at her own request, the alleged rejected sexual advance at the 2018 Halloween party, successfully stopping Mr. Gopal from deducting pension contributions from her pay, and the 2021 text exchange over patient care that devolved into petty insults—are “too few, too separate in time, and too mild,” Alfano, 294 F.3d at 379-80 (collecting cases), to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Plaintiff experienced an objectively hostile work environment based on sex that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of her employment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim fails on the merits and Defendant is separately entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claims on this basis as well.
The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims asserted under the more liberal New York State and City Human Rights Law claims.