In D’Aiello v. Freeport High Schools et al, No. 23-CV-00577 (JMA) (SIL), 2026 WL 3136043 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim.
Among other comments alleged by plaintiff (who is white) to support her hostile work environment claim was the use of the term “Karen,” which she contends to be a derogatory term for white women.
From the decision:
Factors to consider in determining whether an environment was sufficiently hostile include: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “As a general rule, incidents must be more than ‘episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive.’ ” Id. (citing Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Yan v. Ziba Mode Inc., No. 15-cv-47, 2016 WL 1276456, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) (“[A] plaintiff must show ‘either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.’ ” (quoting Desardouin v. City of Rochester, 708 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2013)). “Isolated incidents usually will not suffice to establish a hostile work environment.” Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2012).
Although D’Aiello claims that she subjectively perceived the environment at Freeport to be hostile, she fails to put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the conduct she was subjected to was severe or pervasive. D’Aiello repeats the same factual allegations from her discrimination and retaliation claims in support of her hostile work environment claim. In connection with this hostile work environment claim, the Court has considered all relevant points that were already addressed above in connection with Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, including, inter alia,: the “Karen” and “fairyland” comments; Jackson’s alleged “mocking” of D’Aiello’s disability; Johnson’s “mob boss” comments concerning Langan, and the School’s alleged failure “to take proper disciplinary action against non-Caucasian employees, such as Dr. Johnson and Ms. Jackson.”22 (Pl. Opp. at 30.) She claims that she suffered from “substantial anxiety and stress and, [sic] thus, unable to complete work due to the hostile environment.” (Id.)
These incidents do not rise to the level of pervasiveness or severity to state a claim for hostile work environment. Even assuming the “Karen” and “fairyland” comments had to do with race, they were isolated. D’Aiello does not offer evidence of any further discriminatory comments that were directed at her from Jackson, Johnson, or anyone else.23 Jackson’s mocking, even assuming it had to do with D’Aiello’s disability, was also isolated to the November 19th meeting. Moreover, Jackson stopped and apologized, and Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence that D’Aiello had contact (or negative interactions) with her after the November 19th Meeting. D’Aiello also had little contact with Johnson in the aftermath of the meeting (aside from the lockdown drill incident and the “wrong door” comment). That is not the kind of “pervasive conduct” necessary to support a hostile work environment claim. See e.g., Anderson v. State of New York, Off. of Ct. Admin. of Unified Ct. Sys., 614 F. Supp. 2d 404, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Anderson v. Cahill, 417 F. App’x 92 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the employer’s alleged racist remarks, which plaintiff heard over the course of several years, did “not constitute pervasive conduct amounting to a hostile work environment.”). Rather, these are “isolated instances that are neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive to alter the terms of Plaintiff’s employment” and therefore fall “far short of a claim for a hostile work environment.” Harris v. Off. of N.Y. State Comptroller, 20-cv-8827, 2022 WL 814289, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2022); see also Wilson v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., No. 21-cv-1971, 2022 WL 17587564, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2022) (“Treatment that did not constitute adverse action cannot, a fortiori, have ‘create[d] an abusive working environment.’ ”).
D’Aiello alleges, at most, isolated incidents, which are simply “too few, too separate in time, and too mild, under the standard so far delineated by the case law, to create an abusive working environment.” Lekettey v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-2528, 2015 WL 1442521, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 659 (2d Cir. 2016); see, e.g., Shim-Larkin v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-6099, 2023 WL 6519581, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2023) (report and recommendation), adopted by, No. 16-cv-6099, 2023 WL 6236368 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023) (finding that “one explicit comment related to [plaintiff’s] status as a victim of domestic violence … two incidents involving comments about her race and ethnicity … and two comments about her age” were not “are sufficiently related or continuous to support a claim of hostile work environment with respect to any of Plaintiff’s protect[ed] characteristics”); Gerzhgorin v. Selfhelp Cmty. Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-04344, 2022 WL 912523, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-808, 2023 WL 2469824 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2023) (finding that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a “handful of comments” by plaintiff’s supervisors, made over the course of three months, were neither sufficiently pervasive nor sufficiently severe to create an “objectively abusive environment”); White v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 15-cv-1035, 2025 WL 552744, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2025) (sporadic isolated racial comments made by co-workers were comments were not sufficient to sustain plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim).
Additionally, D’Aiello’s allegations regarding the School’s purported failure to take appropriate corrective action and its alleged treatment of her less favorably than African American employees are speculative. As such, they cannot support her discrimination claims and likewise fail to support her hostile work environment claim.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the District failed to properly investigate and respond to her complaints (or that its investigation was tainted by bias), D’Aiello had minimal interactions with Johnson after she complained (and Plaintiff has not cited any evidence of interactions with Jackson). A reasonable jury could only that the lockdown drill interaction and “wrong door” comment were minor events and, even when those incidents are considered, they are insufficient, along with the other evidence, to establish a hostile work environment.
The court concluded that the conduct of which plaintiff complains was not sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of her employment, and therefore cannot support a hostile work environment claim.