In Baker v. Worcester County, Maryland et al, No. CV JKB-26-01719, 2026 WL 3150994 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2026), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently Alleged a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
“Courts have long recognized that sexual harassment can be a violation of Title VII.” Martinez, 2020 WL 4926610, at *4. There are two types of sexual harassment claims under Title VII: “harassment that creates an offensive or hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment, where sexual consideration is demanded in exchange for job benefits.” Rachel-Smith v. FTData, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 734, 745 (D. Md. 2003). Baker alleges both types of sexual harassment and State Defendants challenge both.
Hostile work environment. To establish a hostile work environment, Baker must plausibly allege: (1) that he experienced unwelcome conduct, (2) based on his sex, (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter his conditions of employment and create an abusive environment, and (4) that is imputable to the employer. Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003). State Defendants contend that Baker failed to sufficiently allege the first and third elements.
The first element asks whether the plaintiff “by [his] conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether [his] actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). Unwelcomeness “is not a high hurdle” for plaintiffs to overcome. Strothers, 895 F.3d at 328–29. For example, an employee can prove unwelcome conduct simply by “voicing [his] objection to the alleged harasser or to the employer.” Id. Baker alleges that he did just that: he objected to his alleged harasser, Ramey, and eventually reported the misconduct to her employer. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 39–40.) State Defendants argue that the sexual relationship between Baker and Ramey was “welcome” based on evidence in the investigatory reports, but these are factual matters for a later stage of litigation.
The third element of a hostile workplace claim requires that the offending conduct be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment. Okoli v. City Of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011). This test is both objective and subjective, asking whether “the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive.” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
State Defendants argue, again based on the investigatory reports, that Baker and Ramey’s relationship was “consensual and loving” and did not intrude on the workplace. (ECF No 19-1 at 18.) Taking Baker’s allegations as true, he sufficiently alleges otherwise. Baker alleges that his direct supervisor continually used “emotional pressure” and “warnings” about consequences to his career and family to trap him in a three-year non-consensual sexual relationship. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 28, 31.) That is not an “ordinary tribulation[ ] of the workplace.” Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Rather, Ramey’s frequent alleged harassment and threats to Baker’s career had the “net effect” of an abusive environment that would detract from any reasonable employee’s work performance. Strothers, 895 F.3d at 332. Baker adequately states a claim for a sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment theory.
Quid pro quo. Baker also brings a claim under the quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment. Baker must prove five elements, the first three of which overlap with the hostile work environment inquiry: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group (his gender), (2) was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) based upon sex, (4) the employee’s reaction to the harassment “affected tangible aspects of the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” and (5) the employer “knew or should have known of the harassment and took no effective remedial action.” Okoli, 648 F.3d at 222.
State Defendants dispute that the fourth factor applies because Ramey “never conditioned any employment benefit on continuation of the relationship.” (ECF No. 19-1 at 22.) Not so. Baker alleges that Ramey “warned [Baker] that disclosure would negatively impact … his professional standing, reinforcing that he should remain silent.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 31.) Taken as true, that warning is enough to tie Baker’s reaction to Ramey’s overtures to the terms and conditions of his employment. Baker adequately states a claim for sexual harassment on a quid pro quo theory.
Accordingly, dismissal of this claim was not warranted.