In Navarro v. URBN Playground, NYC, No. 154947/2024, 2026 WL 3322222 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Oct. 20, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
The court summarized plaintiff’s allegations as follows:
Navarro alleges that Crooks repeatedly mocked her Spanish, questioned whether her clothing was Puerto Rican rather than American, criticized her hair, said she did not “fit in,” and suggested that he had not realized she was Hispanic when she was hired. She also describes racially derogatory remarks about another employee. Separately, she alleges repeated exposure to intoxicated and aggressive residents and guests, including a November 9, 2023 incident in which a guest used a racial and gender-based slur and reached for her jacket while Crooks left her to manage the situation.
In assessing plaintiff’s discrimination and harassment allegations, the court explained:
The complaint adequately connects the alleged adverse treatment to Navarro’s Hispanic identity: repeated ethnic and language-based ridicule, allegedly favorable treatment of non-Hispanic employees seeking reassignment, and discharge accompanied by the same “fit in” characterization attributed to Crooks. Navarro alleges satisfactory performance and no disciplinary history. Whether URBN can establish poor performance, lack of vacancies, or contract expiration is a merits question. Its awareness of her ethnicity when hiring her does not conclusively negate the later discriminatory acts alleged (Harrington v City of New York, 157 AD3d 582, 584 [1st Dept 2018]; Cummings, 246 AD3d 560).
The relevant conduct occurred in 2023 and 2024. Executive Law § 296(1)(h) therefore applies without a requirement that harassment be severe or pervasive. The City Human Rights Law independently prohibits treatment that is less favorable because of a protected characteristic; conduct must be assessed in context, with an affirmative defense for petty slights and trivial inconveniences (Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 78-80 [1st Dept 2009]). Repeated ethnic ridicule coupled with disputed employment decisions cannot be reduced, as a matter of law on this pleading, to trivial workplace friction. Repeated mockery of language or accent can support a hostile-environment claim (Kwong v City of New York, 204 AD3d 442, 445 [1st Dept 2022]). General complaints about untidy residents or difficult work, standing alone, would not establish discrimination; the complaint alleges substantially more.
URBN’s joint-employer argument does not dispose of its own liability. Navarro alleges that URBN employed her, received notice, refused corrective action, and made the challenged transfer and termination decisions. Moreover, Brankov v Hazzard, 142 AD3d 445, 445-446 (1st Dept 2016), examines immediate control over employment, including daily supervision, rather than requiring common ownership. The alleged instructions and direct supervision by Crooks support further inquiry into Clinton’s role. URBN’s factual denial cannot defeat those allegations on this motion.
Under the State Human Rights Law, an employer’s knowing acquiescence in discriminatory conduct may establish liability; under the City Human Rights Law, the statutory grounds include managerial conduct and knowing failure to take appropriate corrective action (Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687 [1985]; Zakrzewska v New School, 14 NY3d 469, 479-481 [2010]; Administrative Code § 8-107[13][b]).
The court concluded by noting that plaintiff’s complaint alleges both notice and management’s refusal to intervene, and that the general common-law rule concerning control of third persons does not eliminate these statutory obligations or URBN’s responsibility for its own employment decisions.