In Yalda v. El Paso County Community College, 2026 WL 3362058 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, inter alia, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Yalda’s complaint states that she was denied off-duty work because of her status as a female who reported sexual harassment in the workplace. As evidence of her disparate treatment compared to her peers, Yalda points out that EPCC allows other police officers who are male or who have not complained about sexual harassment4 to work off-duty.
The cognizable protected status at issue here is that of Yalda’s sex. Bostock, 590 U.S. at 656. We conclude that her complaint fails to plausibly allege that EPCC’s adverse actions were in any way motivated by her sex. Yalda’s strongest—and indeed only—factual support is circumstantial evidence regarding male officers who can do off-duty work. But that does not nudge her disparate treatment claim toward plausibility.
The district court rightly noted that circumstantial evidence can support an inference of discriminatory motive if there was some allegation that EPCC treated similarly situated co-workers outside the protected class more favorably. Raj, 714 F.3d at 331. But then it concluded that Yalda made no such allegation because she did not point to a male officer who also reported workplace sexual harassment. The district court’s focus on a nearly identical reporting is too narrow.
Yalda alleged that Officers Edward Thomas and Brandon Gutierrez—male officers permitted to work off-duty—reported workplace racial harassment. Although the race-based reports were technically distinct from Yalda’s own sex-based reporting, both actions are nonetheless protected activity. Yalda and the two male officers were similarly situated in the sense that they all engaged in the protected activity of reporting alleged Title VII violations. These two technically distinct Title VII reports are similar enough for Yalda, Thomas, and Gutierrez to be considered similarly situated for purposes of analyzing EPCC’s alleged sex discrimination.
Even so, other factual allegations undermine any causal inference of sex discrimination. Yalda mentions female co-workers in her complaint. She states she is the only officer not allowed to perform off-duty work. We can infer from these facts that EPCC allows Yalda’s female co-workers to work off-duty. This raises the possibility that EPCC’s adverse action has something to do with Yalda specifically, rather than being motivated by Yalda’s female status. Yalda does not “rule out [that] obvious alternative explanation” and nudge her claim “from conceivable to plausible.” Hikma Pharms. USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 608 U.S. 580, 589–90, 146 S. Ct. 1391, 225 L. Ed. 2d 159 (2026) (citation modified). Under the most generous of readings, Yalda’s factual allegations are “merely consistent with [the] defendant’s liability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). A faithful application of the plausibility standard requires “further factual enhancement” to accept Yalda’s proffered inference of sex-based motive. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Taking all the facts together, we cannot say EPCC’s decision to prohibit her from off-duty work was because of her sex.
The court concluded that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Yalda does not plausibly establish an essential element of her disparate treatment claim, that the complaint does not state a claim for sex discrimination, and therefore the district court did not err by denying default judgment.