In Famighette v. Joseph Rose and Town of Huntington, 17-cv-2553, 2018 WL 2048371 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2018), the court, inter alia,[1]The court also dismissed plaintiff’s gender discrimination/sex stereotyping claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, explained the court, “a discrimination plaintiff need only allege facts suggesting an inference of discrimination.”
Applying the law, the court explained:
Here, Plaintiff has more than met her burden with regards to her claim against the Town for age discrimination. Plaintiff was fifty-six years old when she was terminated. … She was clearly qualified for the position of Executive Secretary, as she held it for fourteen years through three changes in Director of Public Safety. … Moreover, it is uncontested that Plaintiff had no “documented instances of verbal or written warning for any inappropriate behaviors, actions, or statements” and that she held the position without incident and with “distinction and commendation.” … Nevertheless, Plaintiff was fired and replaced with a 23-year-old person with no experience in the position (and only 2 years of experience as a part-time administrative clerk). … This “sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge’ ” suggest an inference of age discrimination. …
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot make out a case of age discrimination because she does not claim that it is the “but for” cause for her employment termination. … Defendants cite to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., in which the Court held that “a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse employment action.” 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s Complaint articulates various theories as to why she was fired, but they all center around her apparent belief that she was not as attractive as the younger, female employee who replaced her.” … As Defendants seem to understand, the fact that Ms. Bologna was “younger” is dispositive. In the Complaint, Plaintiff clearly draws a connection between age and attractiveness. She indicates that Defendant Rose found her less attractive than her replacement because of her older age. By contrast, Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Rose found Ms. Bologna attractive because of her younger age. Plaintiff was replaced without cause, for someone who was significantly younger and inexperienced. This is sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination. Under the Littlejohn standard, the Court need not determine whether age was the “but for” cause at this stage. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied as to Count II of the Complaint.
| ↩1 | The court also dismissed plaintiff’s gender discrimination/sex stereotyping claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. |
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