In Kallinikos v. New York State Dept. of Corrections and Community Supervision et al, 2019 WL 3216769 (EDNY July 17, 2019), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged religious discrimination, in the form of a failure-to-promote, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court explained the applicable pleading standard:
Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff’s Title VII claims “must be plausibly supported by facts alleged in the complaint [ ] that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and has at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015). To be clear, plaintiff need not at this stage allege facts that “give plausible support to the ultimate question of whether the adverse employment action was attributable to discrimination”; she must only plead facts that “give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.”
It next found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that she was a member of a protected class, that she was qualified, that she suffered adverse employment action(s), and that an inference of discrimination was warranted.
As to the latter requirement, the court noted that “an inference of discrimination can arise from, inter alia, the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge” and that “the Second Circuit has stated that [t]he fact that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class will ordinarily suffice for the required inference of discrimination at the initial prima facie stage of the Title VII analysis, including at the pleading stage.”
Turning to plaintiff’s allegations, the court explained:
Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to survive a motion to dismiss on the substance of her claims related to defendants’ failure to promote her. She has alleged that she interviewed for the role of Supervising Parole Officer five times and was never promoted. She has also alleged that she was the only candidate of her specific religious tradition and background. But the 11 other candidates who were promoted over her were of a different background and religion than plaintiff and shared the same background and religion as defendants and each other.
The court dismissed other of plaintiff’s claims, including her claim about being placed on an extended probationary period (since she “has not alleged any facts to suggest that the decision to put and keep her on probation is due to any discrimination on defendants’ part”), as well as her hostile work environment claim (which plaintiff raised for the first time in her opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss).