In Richards v. The Department of Education of the City of New York, 21-cv-338 (LJL), 2023 WL 2876585 (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023), the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s discrimination claim asserted under the New York City Human Rights Law.
This case illustrates the differences between federal anti-discrimination laws, on the one hand, and the broader, more plaintiff/employee-friendly NYCHRL, on the other.
From the decision:
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment or facts that would give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. The cases that Defendants cite for the proposition that Plaintiff must plead a materially adverse change in the terms of her employment, however, arise under federal law. Under the NYCHRL, “courts have held that discrimination claims brought under the NYCHRL do not require a materially adverse employment action. Plaintiff must instead allege simply “differential treatment”—that she is treated “less well”—on the basis of a prohibited characteristic and a discriminatory motive. It is an affirmative defense that “the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial inconveniences.”
Moreover, to allege a discriminatory motive for the purposes of a NYCHRL discrimination claim, Plaintiff need only allege that unlawful discrimination was one of the motivating factors, even if it was not the sole motivating factor, for an adverse employment decision. While courts may still dismiss truly insubstantial cases, even a single comment may be actionable in the proper context. But district courts must be mindful that the NYCHRL is not a general civility code.
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make her claim plausible, and to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence supporting the claim. Among other allegations, Plaintiff claims that she was subject to discipline for alleged infractions that was not imposed on other similarly situated employees who were not of her religion or race. She also alleges that she received a greater workload than other similarly situated employees of a different race or religion. She further alleges that she was threatened with disciplinary action for taking time off while others not of the same race or religion did not receive such treatment.
[Cleaned up.]
The court concluded that those allegations are sufficient to permit discovery to go forward, noting that defendants’ arguments that the claims do not have merit is more properly addressed on summary judgment, rather than at this stage.