In Weaver v. Bloomberg L.P., 22 Civ. 8201 (PAE), 2024 WL 693166 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2024), the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of race-based employment discrimination (termination).
This case illustrates how courts apply the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when analyzing discrimination claims.
From the decision:
The Court finds that Weaver has adduced sufficient evidence that she was terminated because of her race to survive summary judgment. Weaver’s claim centers on Rios. Weaver contends that Rios, motivated by racial animus, causally participated in her termination. Pl. Br. at 6–10. “Evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the” relevant decisionmaker can demonstrate that an adverse employment decision was made “for a discriminatory reason.” Montgomery v. Chao, 546 F.3d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Edrisse v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 381, 389–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying summary judgment in employment discrimination case where reasonable factfinder could conclude that (1) one of plaintiff’s supervisors “harbored animus towards Arabs and Muslims” and (2) the supervisor “played a meaningful role in [defendant’s] decision to suspend plaintiff without pay”). The summary judgment question thus is usefully analyzed in two parts: Does the admissible evidence permit a jury to find that Rios harbored racial animus towards Weaver? And does such evidence permit a jury to find that Rios participated in the decision to terminate Weaver?
The court answered each question in the affirmative.
As to the first question, the court noted the existence of statements that plaintiff’s mid-level manager made about Rios’ views about, and her treatment of, women of color. The primary evidence in this regard was the following excerpted statement by plaintiff’s manager to HR:
Separate from [Weaver’s] performance, Deb [Barker] asked if Aurora [Achong] had ever witnessed any form of discrimination on the team by leadership. [Achong] took a minute to think about it. She said it can appear that Miguelina [Rios] may have issues with women of color with degrees, She said Miguelina [Rios] does not have a degree and rolls her eyes whenever a woman of color discusses their education or experience. Aurora [Achong] said Miguelina [Rios] does not do this to John [Downs] or men on the team. She said she seems to look at women of color with a finer lens and judges them more aggressively. It appears Miguelina [Rios] wants to be the only or best woman of color. Whenever other women of color discuss experience, Miguelina [Rios] will quickly say things like “I have 25 years of work experience at Bloomberg which is what matters.” She also references the fact that her husband (Adrian Rios) works at Bloomberg as well and gives off the vibe that she is “protected.” … Aurora [Achong] said whenever any of this is raised to Miguelina [Rios] in some way, she is dismissive and somewhat “gaslights” by saying she has no idea what they are talking about. Aurora [Achong] advised that she witnesses Miguelina [Rios] talking down, demeaningly, to Alison [Weaver], herself and Obioma [Richardson], but does not speak this way to other women on the team like Mathi K (Miguelina’s peer) [and] Leah Beyen (not a peer). Aurora [Achong] also said that Miguelina [Rios] tends to provide mixed direction. She will tell Aurora [Achong] she is going to give Alison [Weaver] a certain direction, but then gives her a different steer. She said it feels sometimes like she is trying to sabotage her leadership or play Alison [Weaver] against her. She said she does the same thing with Obiama [Richardson]… Aurora [Achong] said that Miguelina [Rios] speaks to her condescendingly and with a petty tone but does not speak like this to white men.
The court held that this statement to HR would likely be admissible for its truth, as it is non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) as a statement “by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.”
The court further found that, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, a factfinder could conclude that Rios played “some” role in her termination. This was sufficient to implicate Title VII, which, the court noted, does not require “but-for” causation.