In Moy v. Napoli Shkolnik, PLLC et al, 2024 WL 3498131 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s – a Chinese American woman – claim of employment discrimination asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (as well as under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws).
After summarizing the black-letter law, the court applied it to the facts, as follows:
It is undisputed that Moy is a member of protected classes and that she was qualified for her position. And there can be no doubt that Moy’s termination was an adverse employment action. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing termination as an example of an adverse employment action). The Court next considers whether being “reduced” to Co-Department Head, Am. Compl. ¶ 36, was also an adverse action. Again, Moy “need show only some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions.” Muldrow, 144 S. Ct. at 977. Moy plausibly meets this burden. In her new role as Co-Department Head, Moy supervised the firm’s New York City office (instead of “running everything” in the Personal Injury Department). Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Moy was also directed to serve as the “second attorney” to a white male, without “authority to resolve those cases.” Id. ¶ 44-n. She was denied opportunities to, inter alia, engage in medical malpractice and nursing home cases. Id. ¶ 44-k. She was “excluded from meetings,” and her “case management duties were in essence eliminated.” Id. ¶ 74. All of this is sufficient to allege an adverse employment action.
Having determined that Moy has successfully alleged at least two viable adverse employment actions, the Court next considers whether there is “at least minimal support for the proposition that [Defendants were] motivated by discriminatory intent” in taking those actions against her. Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311. Moy does not allege direct evidence of discrimination. She seeks instead to establish circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. “[A]n inference of discrimination … arises when an employer replaces a terminated or demoted employee with an individual outside the employee’s protected class.” Id. at 312-13.
Here, Moy does not allege that she was, after her termination, replaced by an individual outside her protected classes. See generally Am. Compl. However, she alleges that she was demoted when her role at the firm changed and she was given the less prestigious title of Co-Department Head. And Moy further alleges that Ciaccio, who—despite having less experience than Moy—was tasked with “running everything” in the Personal Injury Department in Moy’s stead, thereby replaced Moy. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-37 (alleging that Moy would be relegated to the role of supervising attorney while Ciaccio “would be running everything for now”); id. ¶ 44-o (alleging that Moy “possessed more than double the amount of experience of Mr. Ciaccio”). At this early stage of the litigation, such factual allegations are “sufficient to make plausible [Moy’s] claim that her demotion occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 313 (further noting that where a plaintiff “alleges that she was replaced by a white ACS employee” who “was less qualified for the position,” plaintiff raised an inference of discrimination sufficient to survive dismissal). Moy’s Section 1981 employment discrimination claims therefore survive.
The court further explained that plaintiff’s New York State and City Human Rights Law discrimination claims likewise survive dismissal. Noting the “broad and remedial purposes” of the NYCHRL, plaintiff’s allegations – including that while all white male attorneys in the department had trial support, plaintiff did not – were sufficient to state a claim.