In Mitchell v. Planned Parenthood of Greater New York, Inc. et al, Case No. 1:23-cv-01932 (JLR), 2024 WL 3849192 (S.D.N.Y. August 16, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The court explained that to present a prima facie case of retaliation under these statutes, a plaintiff must show four elements, namely, that: (1) she participated in an activity protected by Title VII or the ADA, (2) this participation was known to her employer, (3) the employer subjected her to a materially adverse action thereafter, and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.
As to the first element, the court explained that his complaint (the instant action) constituted protected activity, in that it contained plaintiff’s allegations that “his coworkers’ insensitive comments and conduct created a hostile work environment, and that PPGNY refused to take remedial disciplinary actions despite Plaintiff making multiple formal complaints.”
As to the “adverse action” element, plaintiff alleged “that in the weeks after he filed the Initial Complaint, PPGNY excommunicated [Plaintiff] from key operational and fiscal stakeholder meetings, covertly transitioned several key responsibilities to other PPGNY employees, recorded meetings without Plaintiff’s consent, and ultimately fired Plaintiff.”
Finally, as to the last element, the court explained:
The fourth element of a retaliation claim is a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Moll, 94 F.4th at 239. “To adequately plead causation” under the retaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADA, “the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the retaliation was a but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action.” Duplan, 888 F.3d at 625 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (Title VII); accord Sharikov, 103 F.4th at 170 (ADA). But-for causation “does not require proof that retaliation was the only cause of the employer’s action.” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013). Rather, a plaintiff need only establish that “the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.” Id. “Causation may be shown by direct evidence of retaliatory animus or inferred through temporal proximity to the protected activity.” Duplan, 888 F.3d at 625.
Plaintiff successfully relies on the latter method of showing causation. He alleges that “PPGNY’s retaliatory and discriminatory misconduct intensified dramatically after March 7, 2023.” SAC ¶ 155 (emphasis omitted). Although Plaintiff does not specify exactly when, for example, he was subjected to “rampant incivility” or “excommunicated from key operational and fiscal stakeholder meetings,” these incidents necessarily happened within three weeks after he filed the Initial Complaint because Plaintiff was terminated on March 28, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 155-156, 158. Even looking solely at Plaintiff’s termination, that event was sufficiently close in time to Plaintiff’s filing of the Initial Complaint to support, at least at the pleading stage of this case, the requisite inference of causation. See, e.g., Banks, 81 F.4th at 277 (“[W]e have previously held that a period of several months can demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and the alleged adverse action.”); Zeng v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 22-138, 2023 WL 4553416, at *7 (2d Cir. July 17, 2023) (summary order) (sufficient basis for inferring causation where relevant adverse employment action happened several weeks after plaintiff engaged in protected activity).
Based on the foregoing, the court held that plaintiff states claims for retaliation under Title VII and the ADA.