In Rivera v. The CSI Companies Inc., Case No: 8:24-cv-01450-WFJ-NHA, 2024 WL 4264839 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 23, 2024), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In sum, plaintiff alleged that she received “unwarranted and unwelcome sexual advances” from a co-worker, including graphic references to plaintiff’s body parts (e.g., “p***y”, “cute face”, “fat a**”).
From the decision:
[S]exual harassment is a form of discrimination that Title VII prohibits, and a hostile work environment is a recognized form of sexual harassment. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 (stating the discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes the creation of a hostile work environment). A hostile work environment exists when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment.” Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2012). To show a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature; (3) she was harassed based on her sex; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of her employment; and (5) that her employer was responsible under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999).
The “severe or pervasive” element requires the plaintiff to prove the work environment is both subjectively and objectively hostile. Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir. 2014). “The employee must subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment,…[and] the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A court can look to several factors when considering whether the harassment was objectively severe or pervasive: “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance.” Sutherland v. Boehringer-Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 700 F. App’x 955, 960 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246).
Here, the Court, accepting the alleged facts in the Complaint as true, finds Plaintiff’s claims are sufficient under the above standard. Ms. Rivera has alleged she is a woman who was subjected to workplace harassment during her one year of employment with CSI. Dkt. 1 ¶ 11. The Complaint outlines at least four instances of unwelcome sexual harassment by coworkers over the course of Plaintiff’s employment. See id. ¶¶ 15-82. More specially, the March 2022 allegations involving Brown can be classified as either sexual advances or requests for sexual favors. See Id. ¶¶ 15-34. Plaintiff’s allegations also make it clear that the harassment from Brown and other coworkers was due to her sex. See id. ¶¶ 15, 21, 32-34. Further, Plaintiff asserts CSI was aware of the sexual harassment based on several meetings Ms. Rivera had with CSI’s HR department. See id. ¶¶ 56, 70, 83.
Finally, while the “severe or pervasive” element is a closer call, Plaintiff still meets the exceedingly low threshold of sufficiency to survive a motion to dismiss. See Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., et al., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir. 1983). While the conduct alleged does not meet all the objective factors, much of Brown’s conduct (before being removed from assignments with Plaintiff) can be deemed to be frequent and some alleged instances of harassment can be reasonably viewed as physically threatening and humiliating. See Id. ¶¶ 15-34, 66, 77.
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff may proceed on her sexually hostile work environment claim.