In Cruz v. Local 32BJ and Harvard Maintenance, Inc., 22 Civ. 3068 (PGG) (SDA), 2024 WL 4357036 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024), the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of retaliation under Remove term: 42 USC § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
This Court concludes that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that (1) Cruz engaged in protected activity when she complained to the Union on February 21, 2020 about alleged race discrimination by Harvard; (2) on March 10, 2020, the Union notified Harvard of Cruz’s complaint of race discrimination; (3) that Harvard suspended Cruz’s employment on March 19, 2020; and (4) that Harvard’s suspension of Cruz’s employment occurred only nine days after it had been informed of her complaint of race discrimination.5 A temporal gap of only nine days between notice to an employer of protected activity and an alleged adverse action is adequate to plausibly allege the required causal connection. See Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 319-20 (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations that the demotion occurred within days after her complaints of discrimination are sufficient to plausibly support an indirect inference of causation.”); Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996) (twelve days between complaints about sexual harassment and discharge could suggest a causal relationship); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 769 (2d Cir. 1998) (proof of discharge less than two months after plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint with management, and ten days after she filed a complaint with the state human rights division, constituted prima facie evidence of a causal connection between protected activity and retaliation).
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Section 1981, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.