In Clincy v. Packaging Corporation of America, No. 3:23-CV-547-CWR-LGI, 2024 WL 4311511 (S.D.Miss. Sept. 26, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Generally speaking, there are two types of sexual harassment claims under Title VII: (1) quid pro quo harassment, in which a supervisor demands sexual favors as a condition for job benefits, and (2) harassment that creates an offensive or hostile work environment. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Cerda v. Blue Cube Operations, L.L.C., 95 F.4th 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 2024). This case involves the latter.
To state a claim of hostile work environment, Clincy must allege that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment; and (5) her employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action. See Saketkoo v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1003 (5th Cir. 2022). Defendants argue that she has failed to sufficiently allege elements three and four of this standard.
First, Defendants argue that Clincy failed to allege how the harassment she experienced “related to her sex.” Docket No. 10 at 2. Specifically, Defendants argue that Clincy did not allege any facts to indicate that “McKenzie’s alleged conduct or statements were sexual in nature.” Id. at 8.
The Court disagrees. As the Supreme Court has explained, sexual harassment “include[s] ‘unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.’ ” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)). Clincy claims that she “never had any type of relationship or contact (outside of the normal employment environment) with” McKenzie and “did not invite … McKenzie to brush up against her and make inappropriate comments to her.” Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 20, 37. Clincy has alleged sexual harassment based on sex. And, if there was any doubt about this, Clincy’s response brief elaborates to make crystal clear that “this unwelcomed sexual harassment included sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other unwelcomed, unsolicited and undesirable conduct that” she found offensive. Docket No. 16 at 8.
Defendants also argue that Clincy failed to allege how the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. They say she did not allege how “the behavior was severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.” Docket No. 10 at 8.
Courts evaluate whether an environment is hostile by analyzing the totality of circumstances, “focusing on factors such as the frequency of the conduct, the severity of the conduct, the degree to which the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and the degree to which the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “An egregious, yet isolated, incident can alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment while frequent incidents of harassment, though not severe, can reach the level of pervasive.” Lauderdale v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., Institutional Div., 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).
In our case, Clincy alleges that McKenzie’s sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and unwelcomed, unsolicited, and undesirable conduct affected a condition and privilege of her employment. See Docket No. 16 at 9. She explains that Bailey and Silas contributed to this harassment by altering her clock-in times and transferring her to different work shifts after she reported McKenzie’s conduct. Id. Clincy claims that “[t]hese incidents were not isolated and together, … rose to the level of an abusive work environment.” Id.
“[I]n the Title VII context, the Fifth Circuit has stressed that ‘a plaintiff need not need make out a prima facie case of discrimination in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.’ ” Golden v. McDonough, No. 1:21-CV-129-TBM-RHWR, 2022 WL 1714485, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2022) (citing Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013)). At this stage, Clincy is not required to demonstrate the ultimate success of her claim, but rather to plead facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference of the elements of her claim. See id.; see also Norsworthy v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2023).
The court concluded that when considered together and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff has pled factual content to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
It further concluded that any argument that plaintiff’s claim is indeed meritorious, this argument would be more appropriately raised after discovery, through the use of a summary judgment motion.