In Ronen, Matthew v. Redroute, Inc. et al, 21-CV-2732 (RPK) (RML), 2025 WL 296551 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of “associational discrimination” asserted under the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Ronen has adequately pleaded a claim for discrimination based on association with a disabled person—namely, Ronen’s pregnant spouse. Using language similar to the NYSHRL, the NYCHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice … [f]or an employer … because of the actual or perceived … disability … of any person … [t]o discharge from employment such person.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). Unlike the NYSHRL, the NYCHRL goes on to state that the law “shall be construed to prohibit … discrimination against a person because of the actual or perceived … disability … of a person with whom such person has a known relationship or association.” Id. § 8-107(20). Disability is defined as “any physical, medical, mental or psychological impairment,” including the “impairment of any system of the body.” Id. § 8-102.
The operative complaint contains allegations sufficient to support a claim under this portion of the statute. Ronen alleges that shortly before he was fired, Schiff inquired about whether he would take paternity leave, and that Ronen told him that he intended to do so, explaining that his wife was experiencing “complications with her pregnancy,” would undergo surgery to deliver pre-term, and would “require care during a convalescent period” after the surgery. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 69; see id. ¶ 98. Ronen further alleges that less than two weeks after that conversation, Schiff told him that he had decided to end Ronen’s employment. Id. ¶¶ 69–72. These allegations regarding Ronen’s disclosures and Schiff’s actions plausibly suggest that Ronen was terminated at least in part based on his association with his spouse, who was about to undergo surgery due to a pregnancy with medical complications.
Defendants argue that Ronen’s allegations are inadequate because pregnancy does not qualify as a disability and in any event, the operative complaint does not invoke the concept of disability discrimination. Defs.’ Reply Mem. in Support of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 7 (Dkt. #19) (“Defs.’ Reply”). But these arguments lack merit. The definition of a “disability” under the NYCHRL is broader than under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. See Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 753 (2d Cir. 2021). Even assuming that pregnancy standing alone does not qualify as a disability, Ronen’s allegations that his wife was experiencing “complications” that would require her to undergo surgery to deliver pre-term adequately plead that his wife’s particular pregnancy involved “[a]n impairment of any system of the body,” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102; compare Lin v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 21-CV-6203 (KAM) (MMH), 2024 WL 4266008, at * (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2024) (“[A] normal pregnancy, on its own, does not qualify as a disability within the meaning of the … NYCHRL”), with McKenna v. Santander Investment Sec., Inc., No. 21-CV-941 (DLC), 2022 WL 2986588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2022) (finding that a triable issue of fact existed on the existence of a disability under the NYCHRL based on evidence of “medical complications” arising from pregnancy), and Figueroa v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-9594 (JGK), 2011 WL 309061, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011) (same, based on evidence of a “high-risk pregnancy” and resulting conditions like “anemia[ ] and hemorrhaging”). Moreover, the operative complaint places defendants on notice of a disability discrimination claim because it alleges that defendants violated the NYCHRL by “discriminat[ing] against Plaintiff on the basis of … his association with a pregnant woman,” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 99, while making clear that the pregnancy in question involved medical “complications” that qualify as a disability under the NYCHRL’s definition, see id. ¶ 69.
The court did, however, dismiss plaintiff’s claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law, because those statutes “reach only employment decisions based on an employee’s own sex, pregnancy status, or other protected trait.”