In Schoenadel v. YouGov America Inc., 22-cv-10236 (AS), 2025 WL 371089 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
Here held the court, there were factual issues as to whether plaintiff suffered an “adverse action”:
For the purposes of a retaliation claim, an adverse employment action is any action that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”6 Vega, 801 F.3d at 90 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)). Because “[c]onstructive discharge is considered an adverse employment action sufficient to support a retaliation claim,” Dall v. St. Catherine of Siena Med. Ctr., 966 F. Supp. 2d 167, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), and there’s a triable question about whether Schoenadel was constructively discharged, YouGov’s argument necessarily fails.
But even setting the constructive-discharge issue aside, YouGov isn’t entitled to summary judgment on this prong. Actions that when “considered individually[ ] might not amount to much” can constitute an adverse employment action if, “[t]aken together” they “paint a mosaic of retaliation.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 92. After Schoenadel filed her grievance, she says that she was “further isolated and excluded,” “not invited to leadership meetings that should have included [her],” [s]enior leaders would not email or call [her], other than an occasional communication from Saez,” and “[w]hen [Schoenadel] requested information, [she] was ignored.” Dkt. 94 ¶ 193. Although YouGov cites to cases holding that exclusion from meetings doesn’t constitute an adverse action, see Dkt. 76 at 29–30, a reasonable juror might find that YouGov’s actions, collectively, “could … dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90 (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57). After all, “[t]he real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)). “A supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, … [b]ut to retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.”
Turning to the causation element of this claim, the court explained:
As for the causal-connection prong, “[u]nlike Title VII discrimination claims, … the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the retaliation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90. “It is not enough that retaliation was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the employer’s decision.” Id. at 90–91. However, “[r]equiring proof that a prohibited consideration was a ‘but-for’ cause of an adverse action does not equate to a burden to show that such consideration was the ‘sole’ cause.” Zann Kwan, 737 F.3d at 846 n.5. “A plaintiff may prove that retaliation was a but-for cause of an adverse employment action by demonstrating weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its action.” Id. at 846.
YouGov says that Schoenadel can’t prove a causal connection here because YouGov began excluding her from meetings in July 2021, before she made her first HR complaint. Dkt. 76 at 29–30. But Schoenadel says that her protected activity here actually occurred in three stages. First, on July 11, 2021, Schoenadel sent a complaint to Saez and Horowitz that her responsibilities “seem[ed] to be diminishing, assigned to others, placing [her] in a probable position of irrelevance,” and that she sensed bias was playing a role. Dkt. 98-126. Saez forwarded this complaint to Chahal. Id. Second, on November 11, 2021, Schoenadel emailed Saez and HR a similar complaint. Dkt. 75-1. Finally, on December 23, 2021, Schoenadel filed a grievance with HR formally alleging gender discrimination. Dkt. 75-18.
Because Saez forwarded Schoenadel’s July 11, 2021, email to Chahal, Schoenadel says that YouGov leadership was “on notice of protected activity at the time Schoenadel was excluded from meetings in July.” Dkt. 97 at 31. YouGov doesn’t respond to this argument, nor does it address Schoenadel’s argument that her exclusion and isolation worsened after her complaints to HR, other than to question whether Schoenadel can testify about these things, which the Court has already addressed. See supra notes 1-2. There is a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of causation.
Having found that plaintiff’s claim survived under Title VII, the court likewise held that it survived under the New York State Human Rights Law (which employs the same standard as Title VII), as well as the New York City Human Rights Law (which imposes a “more permissive” standard).