In Cherner v. CF Bankshares Inc., 24-CV-02812 (PMH), 2025 WL 1745864 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Title VII “makes actionable any form of sex-based compensation discrimination.” Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Claims under Title VII are subject to the burden-shifting framework adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). However, at the motion to dismiss stage, only the first step—the plaintiff’s burden to allege a prima facie case of discrimination—is at issue. See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII … a plaintiff must allege that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Malloy v. Pompeo, No. 18-CV-04756, 2020 WL 5603793, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020). At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff “need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “the plaintiff also may create a ‘mosaic’ of intentional discrimination by identifying ‘bits and pieces’ of evidence that together give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hamilton v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc., No. 23-CV-07408, 2025 WL 863572, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2025). “A common and especially effective method of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination” is “showing that the employer treated a similarly situated employee differently.” McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendants’ motion only contests the fourth element, i.e., whether “the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Malloy, 2020 WL 5603793, at *15. Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that any adverse action occurred because of Plaintiff’s gender or any other protected characteristic; and that Plaintiff failed to allege “a single act on the part of any Defendant that could conceivably be interpreted as discriminatory or showing discriminatory intent.” (Def. Br. at 5-6). The Court disagrees.
At this stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently cleared this “low pleading threshold” and shown an inference of discrimination by alleging that Plaintiff, a male, was treated less favorably than a less-qualified female, Pam Foster, who was appointed BSA Officer instead of him. (AC ¶¶ 34-48). Further, Plaintiff alleges he was unable to complete his job properly and was discriminated against by Defendant McKinney, when she told “certain female individuals” that they did not have to respond to Plaintiff and “could ignore his requests for information or documents.” (Id. ¶¶ 68-69). Ultimately, Plaintiff was then terminated from his role as a “VP, BSA Officer,” when he was told that the “bank was going in a different direction,” and the HR Manager was unable to provide any additional information as to the reason for his termination. (Id. ¶¶ 76-79).
Considering the above, and even though they may be extremely “thin,” such allegations constitute “bits and pieces of evidence” that together create a “mosaic” sufficient to clear the low pleading threshold and constitute an inference of discrimination. Hamilton, 2025 WL 8693572, at *12 (holding that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a Title VII claim for gender discrimination at the motion to dismiss stage where he alleged that he was “treated less favorably than his former assistant, a woman”); Styles v. Westchester Cnty., No. 18-CV-12021, 2020 WL 1166404, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2020) (“[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class will suffice for the required inference of discrimination at the prima facie stage of the Title VII analysis.” (quoting Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original)).
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff “has pled sufficient facts to allege a gender discrimination claim at the motion to dismiss stage” and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.