In McCarthy v. Motorola Solutions Inc. & Joshua Thompson, No. 21-CV-4020 (RER) (MMH), 2025 WL 2482247 (E.D.N.Y., 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of age discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
First, Plaintiff has failed to connect Defendant Thompson’s conduct to discriminatory intent. Plaintiff conceded that Thompson made no direct comments about her age. (McCarthy Dep. 131:4–132:7). Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence of Thompson showing animus towards older employees in writing. Plaintiff has also not shown that Thompson had a pattern of treating young or younger project managers with unmerited favor. But see e.g., Stinson v. Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC, 1:22-cv-06164 (JLR), 2024 WL 3848515, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024) (denying summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s NYCHRL age discrimination claim based on adverse employment actions in 2017 and 2018 because the plaintiff provided admissible evidence of a supervisor dismissing a job candidate as “too old” and of that same supervisor excluding the plaintiff and another older colleague from a team dinner); Verne v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 697 F. Supp. 3d 30, 47–51, 59–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff’s ADEA discrimination claim and NYCHRL age discrimination and hostile work environment claims because a triable issue of fact remained based on the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the defendant principal gave several senior teachers negative reviews and disciplinary charges and replaced senior teachers with new teachers and an email from the plaintiff’s union representative stating that defendants gave the plaintiff an “unachievable” Teacher Improvement Plan.).
Rather, Plaintiff asks the Court to adopt her own subjective belief about why Thompson asked her to complete additional tasks and made rude, demeaning comments to Plaintiff, such as Plaintiff being unable to “fit in” at the Motorola Solutions, Inc. (“MSI”) Brooklyn office. (McCarthy Dep. 126:6–12.) Plaintiff specifically asks the Court to infer discriminatory intent from Thompson’s alleged “surprised face” after looking at Plaintiff’s passport. (Id. 126:13–128:17.) A passport, however, contains many pieces of information. Without more, the Court cannot assume that Thompson’s “surprised face” was due to seeing Plaintiff’s age. Indeed, Plaintiff herself did not see Thompson read her passport. (Id. 132:13–20.) So too with Thompson’s comment about “fit[ting] in.” Without more, such a comment does not cross the line from Thompson being “obnoxious and overbearing” to being discriminatory. Though Plaintiff proffers a conclusory argument in her motion that Thompson made the comment because of her age, (ECF No. 57 (“Pl.’s Mem. of Law”) at 2), Plaintiff’s deposition testimony reveals that she subjectively believed—or had an “impression”—that Plaintiff made the comment because of animus towards her age but did not have any actual written or verbal statements from Thompson to show actual discriminatory animus underlying Thompson’s actions. (McCarthy Dep. 126:6–128:17, 131:4–132:4.) The Court therefore lacks sufficient admissible evidence to connect Thompson’s conduct to a discriminatory motive.
Second, Plaintiff has also failed to show that Diana Gallego’s conduct was discriminatory. As with Thompson, Plaintiff asks the Court to adopt her own subjective belief that Gallego’s actions were based on discriminatory motives without providing evidence of any comments, writings, or differential treatment showing explicit or implicit animus towards older employees. Plaintiff asserts that Gallego must have treated Plaintiff badly because Gallego was close to Thompson. (McCarthy Dep. 268:17–271:19.) Indeed, other employees referred to Gallego as Thompson’s “Queen Bee.” (McCarthy Dep. 116:17–20, 208:5–15.) Still, the Court cannot infer discriminatory animus to Gallego based on her association with Thompson whose own alleged discriminatory intent is based off his alleged reaction to reading Plaintiff’s passport. In fact, the evidence paints the picture of Thompson and Gallego as running a workplace where they could haze new employees, regardless of age, with impunity. (See McCarthy Dep. 269:20–271:19; ECF No. 57-3, Ex. 30 (“MSI HR Report”) at 8–9.) Yet Thompson and Gallego were wrong, leading to the final reason that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the fourth element of her prima facie case.
Third, MSI acted to stop Thompson and Gallego’s bad behavior after conducting an investigation spurred by Plaintiff’s complaints. MSI disciplined Gallego and transferred her out of the Brooklyn office. (ECF No. 56-2, Ex. D (“Marks Dep.”) 74:8–78:17; ECF No. 57-3, Ex. 14 (“Gallego Dep.”) 113:9–22.) Thompson had to undergo additional coaching and speak with his supervisor, Miraj Oza, for at least an hour. (Marks Dep. 90:7–13; ECF No. 57-3, Ex. 12 (“Thompson Dep.”) 195:10–13.)
Based on this, the court found that plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of discrimination under the NYCHRL.