In Schneidermesser v. NYU Grossman School of Medicine, 2025 WL 2732877 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s age-based hostile work environment claim.
From the decision:
NYU Langone raises two arguments in its motion. First, it contends that Ms. Schneidermesser failed to establish that the allegedly hostile treatment that she endured at work rose to such a level that it altered the terms and conditions of employment. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Recons. (“Def.’s Br.”) at 4-6, ECF No. 84. “This test has objective and subjective elements: the misconduct shown must be ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment,’ and the victim must also subjectively perceive that environment to be abusive.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). As to the subjective element, NYU Langone relies heavily on deposition testimony and a declaration from Ms. Schneidermesser that, in essence, described how much she enjoyed working there. See Def.’s Br. at 5 (quoting Schneidermesser Dep. 32:14-17, 73:24-25, 75:13-16, ECF No. 64-1, and Schneidermesser Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 64). But there is nothing inconsistent about suffering from a hostile work environment at a job that one otherwise loves, and Ms. Schneidermesser provided substantial testimony as to how the allegedly hostile work environment that she endured affected her deeply. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Recons. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 7, ECF No. 88 (describing deposition testimony that the environment was “overwhelming,” “horrible,” “terrible,” “awful” and that she “didn’t even want to come into work” because she didn’t “know[ ] what they’re going to say to me again, or what they’re going to do.”). As to the objective element, the Court previously noted that the evidence in the record is inconsistent as to whether the comments and behavior that Ms. Schneidermesser complains of were meant as terms of endearment or as expressions of hostility. See SJ Order at 15. Thus, “[r]esolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in [Plaintiff’s] favor, [the Court] cannot say as a matter of law that these incidents could not amount to a claim of a hostile work environment.” Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 F.4th 55, 76 (2d Cir. 2023).
Next, NYU Langone raises the Faragher/Ellerth defense, which “comprises two elements: that (1) ‘the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any [discriminatory] harassing behavior,’ and (2) ‘the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.’ ” Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)); see Def.’s Br. at 6-8. This argument fails for two reasons. First, it was not raised in NYU Langone’s motion for summary judgment. See Analytical Survs., Inc., 684 F.3d at 52. NYU Langone seems to imply that this defense became apparent to it only after the Court ruled on summary judgment, see Def.’s Br. at 7, but this does not mean that NYU Langone could not have raised this defense in its opening summary judgment papers. In any event, Ms. Schneidermesser disputes NYU Langone’s contention that she did not avail herself of its anti-discrimination policies, including by complaining to a doctor there who, she says, was obliged to report her complaints to the Employee Relations Department, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 11-12. Accordingly, on the record before the Court, there are disputes of fact as to both elements of the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
Based on this, summary judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim was not warranted.
However, the court also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s earlier decision granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s discriminatory termination claim.