In Carey v. NYS Department of Health, 2025 WL 2732918 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claims asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
This decision illustrates the difference between the relatively restrictive federal law, on the one hand, and the more plaintiff-friendly state and city laws, on the other.
As to federal law, the court explained:
Even crediting Plaintiff’s version of events, the record does not support a finding that the alleged conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment. The three sex-based remarks by Vazquez over roughly four months — “wear pumps,” “calm down, girl,” and “honey” — were limited and infrequent, were not physically threatening, and at most were mildly offensive. The comments did not create a hostile work environment as a matter of law.
However, the court reached the opposite conclusion under state law:
Unlike its federal counterpart which is dismissed because the offensive conduct was not severe or pervasive, the NYSHRL hostile work environment claim survives. Following post-2019 amendments, a plaintiff need only establish that she was “treated less well than other employees because of [a protected characteristic],” and the statute expressly rejects any requirement that the conduct be “severe or pervasive.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h). The statute also provides an affirmative defense where the conduct amounts only to “petty slights or trivial inconveniences.” Id. The amended standard tracks the “treated less well” standard of the NYCHRL, although NYCHRL cases interpret the city law, not the state statute. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2013) (NYCHRL); Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 41 (1st Dep’t 2009) (NYCHRL). Courts applying the amended NYSHRL accordingly ask whether a reasonable jury could find that the alleged harassment subjected the plaintiff to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of a protected characteristic and deny summary judgment when that showing is met. See Zimpfer v. Hilbert Coll., No. 21 Civ. 231, 2025 WL 1758266, at *21 (W.D.N.Y. June 25, 2025) (NYSHRL); Maryse v. PFNY LLC, No. 23 Civ. 891, 2024 WL 3087533, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2024) (NYSHRL); Wheeler v. Praxair Surface Techs., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 3d 432, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (NYSHRL).
Here, a jury crediting Plaintiff’s account could find that the pattern of disparate treatment — as detailed in relation to the federal discrimination claim — resulted in Plaintiff “being treated less well on account of [her sex].” Wheeler, 694 F. Supp. 3d at 455. Whether the conduct created inferior terms, conditions or privileges, as opposed to petty slights or trivial inconveniences, is a question of material fact precluding summary judgment. See id. (denying summary judgement in analogous context); Maryse, 2024 WL 3087533, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2024) (same). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s NYSHRL hostile work environment claim survives, to the extent it relies on post-January 25, 2022, conduct — consistent with the surviving disparate treatment claims.
The court likewise found that plaintiff’s claims survived under the likewise broad New York City Human Rights Law.