In Pagan v. Research Foundation of the City University of New York et al, No. 24-CV-6500 (RA), 2025 WL 2793685 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of religion-based discrimination asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This decision is a good example of how courts assess such claims at the pleading stage.
From the decision:
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on protected classifications, including religion. Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. On a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff bears a de minimis burden to plead a prima facie case of disparate treatment under this framework by establishing (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. At this early stage of litigation, the allegations in the complaint need only give plausible support to the reduced prima facie requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas in the initial phase of a Title VII litigation. A Title VII complaint need not plead a prima facie case, but rather must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
Defendants dispute only the fourth element—that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. To satisfy this element on a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that her Title VII protected characteristic (here, religion) was a motivating factor in her employer’s decision to take an adverse action against her. At this early stage of the litigation, the question is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail, but whether the well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., whether plaintiffs allege enough to nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. A plaintiff must, nonetheless, provide at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent, either directly or indirectly. Discrimination may be established indirectly by showing that the employer’s stated reason for its employment action was pretext or by otherwise creating a mosaic of intentional discrimination by identifying bits and pieces of evidence that together give rise to an inference of discrimination. Generalized, conclusory allegations are not enough.
Plaintiff alleges that she suffered adverse action because she is a devout Christian, because of her expression of faith, and because of her beliefs. The CUNY Defendants argue that Plaintiff has effectively put forth two different theories of discrimination, both of which are insufficiently supported by factual content to be plausible under Iqbal. They contend that Plaintiff’s first theory, that she was discriminated against because she is a devout Christian, is not supported by evidence of criticism or comments about her religion, or allegations that a similarly situated employee received better treatment. They assert that Plaintiff’s second theory, that she was treated differently because of her “expression of faith,” fails because an employer may legally discipline an employee for offensive comments made to other employees without committing discrimination.
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination based on her religious beliefs. Under Title VII and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff need not prove (or plead) that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. An inference of discrimination can arise from circumstances including the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge. In considering this sequence of events, evidence of temporal proximity between the time an employer learns of an individual’s inclusion in a protected class and termination is often an important consideration. The Court finds that the close temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s disclosure of her conversion to Christianity to her supervisor—as well as Rich’s alleged “enraged” reaction when Plaintiff expressed her beliefs to him, and her termination shortly thereafter supports an inference of discriminatory intent and is sufficient to plead a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII.
(Cleaned up.)
The court rejected defendants’ argument that the defendants had a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff – alleged offensive comments made by plaintiff – and held that an evaluation of such a contention must await a more developed factual record, best assessed on a motion for summary judgment.