In Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, No. 24-1103, 2025 WL 3007285 (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – applying the “stray remarks” doctrine – affirmed the lower court’s award of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim of sex-based discrimination.
From the decision:
Nambiar points to remarks made by defendants that suggest a general gender bias. When evaluating whether such comments are probative of discriminatory intent, we consider a number of factors, including: “(1) who made the remark (i.e., a decision-maker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker); (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark (i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory); and (4) the context in which the remark was made (i.e., whether it was related to the decision-making process).” Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). It is well established that “ ‘stray remarks’ alone do not support a discrimination suit.” Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998).
The circumstances of the allegedly gender-biased remarks are disputed. But even drawing all inferences in Nambiar’s favor and accepting her version of the facts for purposes of summary judgment, we conclude that the remarks do not support an inference that gender animus influenced defendants’ decision making. Critically, Nambiar provides almost no context for the purportedly discriminatory remarks. She testified that Checo told her that “other partners” had made comments referring to the pain management department staff as “girls,” and commented that “there is too much drama … because they are female.” App’x at 390-91. She also testified that she “was told” that someone made a comment “that once [she, Nambiar,] got the new contract that maybe we should not send patients down there when she is having her period because, you know, they are all going to be, you know, girls together.” App’x at 390. These alleged comments surely invoke gender stereotypes.4 Nambiar does not assert, however, that she heard them directly, nor that she is aware of the context in which they were made, nor even who made them. She makes no claim that such comments were made close in time to the decision to terminate her employment, or that they had any relationship to that decision.
Nambiar further asserts that Silverberg “told her that patients and staff had complained that Dr. Nambiar was ‘too unfriendly,’ ‘too demanding,’ ‘too aggressive,’ and that she needed to be, in his words, sweeter, kinder, and more gentle; and to ‘give [the patients] something,’ as COG was a small practice that relied [on] referrals.” App’x at 170. In her briefing, Nambiar describes these complaints as “criticisms” leveled by the defendants, and calls them “blatantly sexist.” Appellant’s Br. at 35. But these “criticisms” came from “patients and staff,” not from Silverberg or any other defendant. App’x at 170. Under Nambiar’s own version of the events, Silverberg came to her with reports of specific complaints from patients and staff, and asked her to adjust her conduct in direct response to those complaints. That does not support an inference that the ultimate decision to terminate Nambiar’s employment based in large part on these very complaints was pretext for discrimination.
The court concluded that plaintiff “has failed to point to evidence that would support a finding that defendants’ proffered reason for her termination – complaints from patients and staff – was mere pretext.”