In Scivetti v. Compass Inc. et al, No. 24-CV-3868 (DEH), 2025 WL 3097331 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim, on the ground that while plaintiff engaged in “protected activity,” she did not allege that defendants knew of her complaints.
From the decision:
Scivetti’s claims for unlawful retaliation also fail because she does not allege that Defendants knew of Scivetti’s complaints to Walsdorf regarding Koeneke’s harassment. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in a protected activity under Title VII; (2) the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took an adverse action against the plaintiff based upon her activity; and (4) a causal connection existed between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse action taken by the employer. Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 2006). “[T]he allegations in the complaint need only give plausible support to the reduced prima facie requirements” at the motion to dismiss stage. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 316 (2d Cir. 2015).
The complaint comes close to meeting these requirements but ultimately falls short. Scivetti’s complaints to Walsdorf regarding sexual harassment clearly constitute a protected activity. See, e.g., Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 318-19 (explaining that the “opposition clause protects such complaints to management and protests against discrimination”); Cruz, 202 F.3d at 566 (“[T]he law is clear that opposition to a Title VII violation need not rise to the level of a formal complaint in order to receive statutory protection, this notion of ‘opposition’ includes activities such as ‘making complaints to management … and expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges.’ ” (quoting Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990))). However, she never alleges that she told anyone other than Walsdorf about Koeneke’s conduct. And while she alleges that Walsdorf made Slater aware of Koeneke’s behavior generally, she does not she allege that Walsdorf told Slater, Berkeley, or anyone involved in her firing about her complaints specifically. Because knowledge of a Plaintiff’s engagement in a protected activity is a requirement for a retaliation claim under Title VII, Counts II and III must be dismissed. Compare Rice v. Smithtown Volkswagen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 375, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying motion to dismiss where Plaintiff alleged that adverse employment action occurred directly because of Plaintiff’s complaints at direction of a supervisor with knowledge of those complaints).
The court also dismissed plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim as untimely.