In Coleman v. Telles, No. 2:24-CV-00930-APG-MDC, 2025 WL 2962786 (D. Nev. Oct. 16, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination asserted under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
From the decision:
The ADEA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). A plaintiff may allege disparate treatment under the ADEA through direct or circumstantial evidence. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004). Direct evidence is “conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.” Id. (simplified). Circumstantial evidence is evaluated under the burden-shifting analysis laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To allege a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence, Reid must plausibly allege that she (1) was “at least forty years old,” (2) was “performing [her] job satisfactorily,” (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, and (4) was “either replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted); see also Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). An “inference of age discrimination” can be established by “showing the employer had a continuing need for [the employee’s] skills and services in that their various duties were still being performed or by showing that others not in their protected class were treated more favorably.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000) (simplified).
Here, Reid plausibly alleges facts to support her age discrimination claim. She alleges she was over 40 years old and performed her job satisfactorily. ECF No. 50 at 4, 30. Reid alleges an adverse employment decision by claiming that she was stripped of her duties, made to perform entry-level tasks, and left off emails that contained information relevant to her job. Id. at 17. Clark County points out that Reid kept her job as assistant public administrator and was never formally replaced or discharged. But transferring job duties away from an employee can constitute an adverse employment decision. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376. As such, Reid has sufficiently alleged the third element of an age discrimination claim.
Finally, Reid must allege that she was either replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications or that there are circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in her favor, Reid has plausibly alleged circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. She alleges that Telles had a continuing need for her skills because younger PAO employees were performing her duties and that Telles called her an “old-timer.” ECF No. 50 at 16-17, 30; see Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891; France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (direct evidence of the hiring manager preferring “young, dynamic agents,” standing alone, would be “thin support” to deny summary judgment for the employer but could be considered along with circumstantial evidence).
Based on this, the court held that dismissal of plaintiff’s ADEA claim was not warranted.