On November 18, 2025, the New York Court of Appeals heard oral argument in the case of Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, concerning the applicability of New York Labor Law § 201-d – which prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s “recreational activities” – to a teacher’s claim that she was fired for making a blog post which criticized Israel for airstrikes in Gaza and warning of the dangers of conflating Zionism and Judaism.
The appeal follows the decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department (Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, 228 A.D.3d 688, 689, 210 N.Y.S.3d 506, 507 (App. Div. 2 Dept. June 5, 2024)), which affirmed the lower court’s decision dismissing plaintiff’s claim.
From the decision:
The plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from her employment as an instructor at the defendant Westchester Reform Temple (hereinafter WRT) after the director of WRT learned that the plaintiff had co-authored a blog post that was published on her public website which expressed anti-Zionist views and was critical of Israel. The plaintiff commenced this action, alleging that the termination of her employment violated Labor Law § 201–d(2)(c), which bars an employer from discharging an employee because of the employee’s legal recreational activities outside work hours. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The Supreme Court properly granted dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). “On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts therein must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference” (Angeli v. Barket, 211 A.D.3d 896, 897, 180 N.Y.S.3d 564; see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511). “Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one, and unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate” (Rabos v. R & R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 849, 851–852, 955 N.Y.S.2d 109; see Nassau Operating Co., LLC v. DeSimone, 206 A.D.3d 920, 926, 171 N.Y.S.3d 528).
Even assuming, without deciding, that blogging is a protected recreational activity under Labor Law § 201–d, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was discharged, not for the activity of blogging, but for the content of the blog post. Thus, we agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiff was not discharged due to a protected recreational activity within the scope of Labor Law § 201–d(2)(c) (see id.; Bilquin v. Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 286 A.D.2d 409, 729 N.Y.S.2d 519). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.
Hopefully, the Court of Appeals will render a decision that clarifies employee rights in the context of increasingly prolific online activity.