In Yehoshua v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority et al, No. 21-CV-4055 (FB) (RML), 2025 WL 3251032 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s clams of a religion-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
A hostile work environment claim requires a showing … that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, and … that a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Quinn v. Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998) (same standard governs state law claims). That is, a plaintiff “must show that the workplace was so severely permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that the terms and conditions of her employment were thereby altered.” Alfano, 294 F.3d at 373. “[A] hostile work environment claim analyses a workplace environment as a whole to discover whether it is abusive.” Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d. Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants “created, promoted, and maintained a pervasively hostile work environment and atmosphere.” Compl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 1. She points to the following events as evidence of such an atmosphere: (1) that Khahaifa refused to excuse her late arrival, (2) that Khahaifa changed her trial assistant for a few weeks, (3) that Khahaifa assigned cases unevenly and timed her assignments to interfere with Yehoshua’s Sabbath observance, and (4) that she was disciplined for her workplace misconduct in a discriminatory manner.
Because there is no evidence linking these facially neutral actions to a religiously hostile working environment Plaintiff is unable to show “intimidation, ridicule, and insult” severe enough to have altered the conditions of her employment. Alfano, 294 F.3d at 373. Far from being pervasive, the incidents described were episodic at best and occurred for nondiscriminatory reasons rooted in departmental policy. Because the record does not indicate that any of these actions were discriminatory or served to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, her hostile workplace claims fail.
First, as to the timekeeping dispute, Yehoshua argues that her tardiness should have been excused because she needed to leave work early for the Sabbath. However, while antidiscrimination laws require reasonable accommodations for religious practices, they do not require employers to overlook workplace misconduct in order to accommodate those same practices. Furthermore, Khahaifa had never received a similar request, so Plaintiff cannot identify a similarly situated employee treated more favorably. SOF ¶ 19; Alston v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 97-108, 1999 WL 540442, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1999), aff’d, 208 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (inability to show employees engaged in similar conduct treated more favorably counsels in favor of summary judgment). Finally, while this incident took place in 2016, Khahaifa recommended Plaintiff receive a promotion and a raise the next year. This detail is fatal to Plaintiff’s suggestion that the timekeeping dispute set off a years-long discriminatory campaign by Khahaifa. See e.g., Williams v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-01353, 2021 WL 1178118, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021) (intervening promotion breaks causal chain of discrimination and retaliation).
Second, Yehoshua claims that her trial assistant was reassigned to punish her for the timekeeping dispute but provides no evidence to support this allegation. Khahaifa claims she changed trial assistant assignments because Yehoshua was relying too heavily on her assistant, and this is supported by the assistant’s declaration. 56.1 Resp. at ¶¶ 26–28; Thompson Decl. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to undermine the validity of this legitimate and nondiscriminatory explanation. See Smith v. N.Y. & Presbyterian Hosp., 440 F. Supp. 3d 303, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (temporary reassignment legitimate and non-discriminatory when intended for professional improvement of plaintiff).
Third, Yehoshua claims that she was assigned more cases than her non-Jewish co-workers and that Khahaifa intentionally assigned these cases late on Fridays to interfere with her observation of the Sabbath. The record, however, indicates that all attorneys in the Unit were assigned roughly the same number of cases, and Yehoshua has provided no evidence to the contrary. SOF ¶ 33. As for the assigning of cases on Friday evenings, the only evidence Yehoshua provided at her deposition was a single email assigning a case on Friday, June 12, 2020, at 1:24 P.M. Yehoshua Dep. 218:6. The Jewish Sabbath begins at sunset on Friday evenings, and on this particular evening the sun set in New York City at 8:27 PM.8 Assigning work to an employee seven hours before the beginning of a religious observance is entirely reasonable.9 As Plaintiff does not dispute that she was not expected to work during the Sabbath, and has provided the Court with no other evidence of discriminatory assignment practices, Khahaifa’s case assignment practices do not support her claims. See Yoselovsky v. Associated Press, 917 F. Supp. 2d 262, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (plaintiff never had to “work on a Saturday (or any Jewish holiday)” weighing against discrimination).
Finally, Yehoshua argues that she was subjected to a discriminatory disciplinary process, specifically that Khahaifa played an ambiguous role in orchestrating the first DAN and later manufactured the Judges’ complaints that led to the second DAN. Compl. ¶¶ 41, 42. As is described in greater detail in the section that follows, Plaintiff provides no evidence to support these allegations. To the contrary, the record—including declarations, depositions, NYCTA’s internal documents, and the OIG’s reports—directly contradicts her claims. These allegations therefore fail to support Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. See Connaughton v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist., No. 21 CIV. 692 (NSR), 2024 WL 1702148, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2024) (summary judgment appropriate when “undisputed … evidence directly contradicts” allegations).
The court concluded that “[n]o reasonable juror could find that the Plaintiff was subjected to conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive, either in isolation or when viewed as a whole, to create a hostile work environment.”