In Mera et al v. SA Hospitality Group, LLC et al, No. 23 CIV. 3492 (PGG) (SDA), 2025 WL 3202080 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2025) – in which plaintiff asserts claims of hostile work environment sexual harassment under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, as well as wage & hour violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law – the court held that all of plaintiff’s claims were entitled to the benefit of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA).
The court rejected the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that “under the EFAA, an arbitration agreement executed by an individual alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute is unenforceable only to the extent that the case filed by such individual ‘relates to’ the sexual harassment dispute” and therefore that since plaintiff’s “wage and hour claims under the FLSA and the NYLL do not relate in any way to the sexual harassment dispute, they must be arbitrated, as the Arbitration Agreement requires.”
The District Judge disagreed:
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that Judge Aaron erred, and that this Court should construe the EFAA to render the “predispute arbitration agreement … void with respect to the … entire case,” even though Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims “do not amount to a sexual harassment dispute.” (Pltf. Br. (Dkt. No. 38) at 6-7 (emphasis omitted)
In considering Plaintiff’s argument, the Court begins “with the statutory text, exhausting ‘all the textual and structural clues’ bearing on its meaning and construing each word ‘in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it.’ ” United States v. Bedi, 15 F.4th 222, 226 (2d Cir. 2021) (first quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 283 (2018); then quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)).
The text of the EFAA provides that “no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). As other courts in this District have noted, the term “case” – as used in the EFAA – “captures the legal proceeding as an undivided whole. It does not differentiate among causes of action within it.” Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 559 (citing dictionary definition of “case” as “a suit or action in law or equity”); see also Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 220 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“An ‘action’ refers to the whole of the lawsuit. Individual demands for relief within a lawsuit, by contrast, are ‘claims.’ ” (internal citations omitted)).
Moreover, Congress used the term “claim” – rather than “case” – “elsewhere in the statute concerning the EFAA’s effective date: Congress provided in a statutory note that the EFAA ‘shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after March 3, 2022.’ ” Diaz-Roa, 757 F. Supp. 3d. at 532 (quoting Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 559 (in turn quoting Pub. L. No. 117-90, § 3, 136 Stat. 26, 28 (2022))). But “Congress selected the word ‘case’ and not ‘claim’ when it described the effect of the EFAA to matters to which it was applicable.” Id. (citing Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 314 (2020) (noting that courts “generally presume[ ] that when Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, Congress intended a difference in meaning” (alteration in original)).
And “Congress’s choice to amend the FAA directly with text broadly blocking enforcement of an arbitration clause with respect to an entire ‘case’ ‘relating to’ a sexual harassment dispute reflects its rejection … of the FAA norm of allowing individual claims in a lawsuit to be parceled out to arbitrators or courts depending on each claim’s arbitrability.” Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (footnote omitted).
This Court further concludes that a claim “relates to” a sexual harassment dispute under the EFAA where, as here, that claim – like the sexual harassment claim – “arise[s] from [a plaintiff’s] employment … and relate[s] ‘to [a plaintiff’s] own experience’ ” working for that employer.
The court rejected the defendants’ reliance on the EFAA’s legislative history (specifically, the floor statement of Senator Joni Ernst), and concluded that where, as here, “the EFAA is properly invoked and applies, a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable as to the plaintiff’s entire case, and not just to plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims.”