In Alegria v. Textron Specialized Vehicles, No. CV 125-087, 2025 WL 3565340 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Here, Plaintiff’s general allegations of unequal terms and conditions of employment do not rise to the level required to sufficiently allege intentional race discrimination. Plaintiff states she was transferred to a heavy labor shift, picked on by coworkers, asked to clean her coworkers’ workstations, and denied her transfer request, but she fails to show facts tying these actions to a racially discriminatory source. (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff does not provide background information on the circumstances of these events such as her race, context of her transfer and transfer denial, details of interactions she had with supervisors, if any, or other facts that suggest racial discrimination or unfair terms of employment.
Further, Defendant correctly argues the allegation that Plaintiff was “picked on” by coworkers is not considered an adverse employment action, as there are no facts indicating Defendant knew of these instances or made any decisions about Plaintiff pursuant to the actions of her coworkers. (Doc. 7-1, at 8-9.); Gregg v. McDonough, No. CV422-144, 2023 WL 2825332, at *11 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2023). Plaintiff stated she did not bring up these issues with her direct supervisor, and no other facts in the complaint show whether decisionmakers in the company were even aware of the situation. (Doc. 1, at 11.)
Defendant asserts that requiring an employee to perform additional tasks, or different tasks than expected, is not considered an adverse employment action. (Doc. 7-1, at 8.); Gregg, 2023 WL 2825332, at *10. Plaintiff states she was “asked to stay behind and clean … the work station of [her] coworkers” and given “additional work assignments” from her regional supervisor, but does not provide facts beyond these assertions to suggest intentional race discrimination. (Doc. 1, at 5, 11.) This alone does not raise her claim above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As such, Plaintiff’s discrimination claim fails to meet the Twombly and Iqbal standards, and does not provide enough factual matter, even when taken as true, to suggest intentional race discrimination.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the court held that dismissal was warranted.