In Petrie v. New York State Office of Mental Health Central New York Psychiatric Center, No. 6:22-CV-123 (ECC/ML), 2026 WL 161198 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Title VII does not impose ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.’ ” McNamara v. County of Saratoga, 748 F. Supp. 3d 68, 89 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2024) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)); Russo v. New York Presby, 972 F. Supp. 2d 429, 447 (Sept. 23, 2013 E.D.N.Y.) (“While ‘the central statutory purpose [of Title VII was] eradicating discrimination in employment, Title VII does not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace.’ ” (quoting Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2012))). Examples of conduct prohibited by Title VII include: “sexual assaults; [other] physical contact[, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied]; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; [and] obscene language or gestures.” Redd, 678 F.3d at 177 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Conduct that does not fall under Title VII’s protection includes “occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers,” see id., as well as “rudeness and excessive criticism of a plaintiff or her work,” Saraceni v. Retting, 726 F. Supp. 3d 101, 122 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297, 321 (2d Cir. 2015)). “Sex-based hostile work environment claims may be supported by facially sex-neutral incidents and ‘sexually offensive’ acts may be facially sex-neutral.” Moll, 94 F.4th at 229 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has offered evidence of incidents of discriminatory harassment by Calkins beginning in November 2019 and continuing until the end of February 2020 that, when viewed as whole and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the environment was objectively hostile and abusive. Specifically, Plaintiff has offered evidence that during this period Calkins subjected her to repeated harassment including sexual comments, unwanted touching, seeking her out and/or calling her for no work-related purpose to tell her that he “missed” her, and sending Plaintiff an email requesting that she “sleepover” with him. There is also evidence that Calkins directed lewd conduct toward another coworker in Plaintiff’s presence. See Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that evidence of harassment directed at other co-workers can be relevant to an employee’s own claim of hostile work environment discrimination, because the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment “as a whole”). The record also contains evidence suggesting that Plaintiff found Calkins’s harassment subjectively hostile and abusive, including reports by Plaintiff’s supervisors and/or coworkers that Plaintiff was “extremely upset and losing sleep,” and Plaintiff’s contention that she took an extended period of leave in May 2020 due, in part, to the continued harassment.
The Moving Defendants argue that the proper inquiry on summary judgment is whether, and to what extent, Calkin’s purportedly harassing conduct occurred after notice was provided to CNYPC; and whether that post-notice conduct was severe or pervasive enough to establish a hostile work environment. This argument is misplaced. While relevant to the inquiry of whether Calkins’s conduct can properly be imputed to CNYPC, Plaintiff is not so limited in establishing whether the work environment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environment.
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered a gender-based hostile-work environment.
The court proceeded to determine that there was a basis for imputing the conduct creating a hostile work environment to defendant, noting that while defendant, “almost immediately” after being placed on notice of the alleged harassment, submitted a formal complaint to commence an investigation into the allegations, a reasonable jury could conclude that the remedial actions were deficient, and that defendant was negligent in controlling its workplace conditions.