In Payne v. NYC Fire Dept., No. 150490/2024, 2026 WL 144437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 09, 2026), the court dismissed the petitioner’s Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination of the New York City Fire Department and the City of New York to terminate his probationary employment as a firefighter.
As to petitioner’s race discrimination claim, the court explained:
It is well-established that a probationary employee may be terminated for almost any reason, or no reason at all, provided that the termination was not made in bad faith, in violation of a statute, or for a constitutionally impermissible purpose (see Turner v Horn, 69 AD3d 522 [1st Dept 2010]; Tsao v Kelly, 28 AD3d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2006]; Witherspoon v Horn, 19 AD3d 250, 251 [1st Dept 2005]). Generally, an agency is afforded wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates for employment, an authority which should be sustained unless clearly abused (see Arrocha v Board. of Education, 93 NY2d 361, 363 [1999]). In instances where an agency makes a showing that it had legitimate reasons for terminating employment, the agency has established that the discharge was made in good faith and is thus sufficient to rebut allegations of bad faith (see Cohen v Koehler, 82 NY2d 882, 884-85 [1993]; Brown v Bd. of Educ., 156 AD3d 451,452 [1st Dept 2017]; Loren v N.Y.C. Dept of Educ.,126 AD3d 419,419 [1st Dept 2015]). As such, when a court finds that an agency determination is supported by a rational, good faith basis, it must sustain the determination even if the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reached by the agency (see Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]).
The court finds that the respondents have established a rational, good faith basis for the petitioner’s termination. The record is replete with evidence of the petitioner’s insubordination and failure to follow direct orders from his commanding officer. During a BITs interview on June 20, 2023, the petitioner admitted that he understood Captain Condon’s directive but purposefully chose to disregard it because he disagreed with the policy’s fairness. The inability to follow the chain of command and direct orders is a legitimate, non-discriminatory ground for discharge.
As to the petitioner’s claims of racial discrimination, they are unsubstantiated by the record. An investigation conducted by the FDNY EEO office concluded there was insufficient credible evidence of disparate treatment. While Petitioner alleges he was treated differently than white firefighters, the investigation found that white probationary firefighters were subject to the same restrictions and only worked outside mutuals when they received the requisite officer approval. Furthermore, Petitioner’s claims regarding harassment over “house tax” and comments about his attire are isolated incidents that do not rise to the level of a hostile work environment and there is also no indication that they involved management or supervisors or were racially based.
The court continued to dismiss the petition alleging retaliation, finding that “the petitioner fails to establish a causal connection between his termination and his EEO complaints” and that “[t]he record clearly shows that the disciplinary process commenced prior to the petitioner filing his EEO complaints,” since “[a]n employer’s continuation of a disciplinary course of conduct begun before a complaint is made does not constitute retaliation.”