In McGinnis v. Plamondon Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Roy Rogers, No. 25-2138-BAH, 2026 WL 221694 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Plaintiff plainly alleges the first and second elements of a Title VII hostile work environment claim—that the conduct of the General Manager was unwelcome, ECF 5, at 16 ¶ 119, and that “gender was a motivating factor” in the conduct, id. ¶ 121. Defendant counters that the intrusions were justified because the General Manager was “checking to see if Plaintiff was using his cell phone.” ECF 8, at 6. As noted, this is a burden-shifting argument that the Court need not consider at this time. The nature of the General Manager’s alleged conduct combined with the allegation that she “did not follow female employees into the restroom or stare at them while they used the bathroom,” ECF 5, at 8 ¶ 47, both create a plausible inference that the bathroom intrusions were based on Plaintiff’s sex. Cf. Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., Civ. No. AW-09-2453, 2011 WL 3880422, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 31, 2011) (determining that at the pleading stage, plaintiff plausibly alleged that her gender was a but-for cause of harassment where plaintiff alleged that out of thirty-nine mostly male students, she was the only individual implicated in a cheating. scandal).
Plaintiff alleges that the General Manager’s actions were subjectively hostile. ECF 5, at 7 ¶ 42 (explaining that Plaintiff experienced the conduct as “sexually assaultive, humiliating, and wholly inappropriate”). But whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the conduct was severe and pervasive so as to create an objectively hostile work environment is a more difficult question. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22 (explaining that this standard is a “middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury”). As noted, whether a work environment is objectively hostile depends on “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Milo, 2019 WL 4447400, at *6. Isolated incidents are generally not sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim. E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572 (D. Md. 2010). However, Plaintiff alleges that the General Manager entered the restroom “repeatedly,” ECF 5, at 17 ¶ 125, and “on multiple occasions,” id. at 8 ¶ 49, and that the conduct continued even after his father made a complaint of harassment, id. at 18 ¶ 132. Plaintiff also alleges that the actions “interfered with [his] ability to perform his job duties.” Id. ¶ 134. Additionally, that a supervisor perpetrated the alleged harassment supports the inference that the conduct was objectively severe or pervasive, because “a supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998). As such, Plaintiff plausibly alleges an objectively hostile work environment. Finally, that the alleged harasser was Plaintiff’s General Manager satisfies the fourth and final element—that the harassment is imputable to the employer. See Hunt v. Constantine Com. Constr., Civ. No. TDC-20-1846, 2023 WL 2744491 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2023) (“If the harasser is a supervisor, the employer is either strictly or vicariously liable for the supervisor’s actions.” (citing Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 333 (4th Cir. 2018))).
Based on this, the court held that dismissal was not warranted, and that plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claims survive.