In Swanson v. Dr. Don Chapman, DDS, PLLC, No. CV 24-1622, 2026 WL 318971 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2026), a sexual harassment case, the court denied defendants’ motion in limine to exclude two instances of alleged sexual misconduct.
The court held that the evidence was relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and not subject to exclusion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in that its probative value outweighed considerations of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
From the decision:
Defendants’ briefing makes much of Plaintiff’s asserted omission of the May and Fall 2023 incidents from her Charge and Complaints,5 and concludes that her failure to allege/identify these incidents as ones which she “opposed” precludes their introduction at trial as evidence which is either (1) irrelevant or (2) more probative than prejudicial/confusing/misleading.6 But, as in their Motion for Summary Judgment (based on a surprising assertion that Dr. Chapman’s COO and HR administrative employee’s “accusator[ial]” and emphatic expression of objection to his action/inaction in response to Powe’s alleged sexual misconduct was merely an “opinion” which failed to meet the prima facie element of “opposition”), Defendants again widely miss the mark.
Plaintiff’s “annoying” exchanges with Dr. Chapman “regarding Powe’s sexual harassment of other of Defendants’ female employees and her admonitions/insistence it be promptly addressed were a quintessential example of an employee opposing an unlawful employment practice.” (Docket No. 52 at 7). And Plaintiff need not have also “opposed” additional instances of Powe’s alleged sexual misconduct for that misconduct to be “relevant” to the likelihood of one or more core fact(s) of her claim (e.g., that Powe was engaging in opportunistic sexual misconduct targeting Defendants’ employees, on their premises, and Defendants delayed and took inadequate action in response).7 More specifically, the May 2023 incident is relevant evidence that Dr. Chapman was aware of Powe’s sexual misconduct toward an employee at that time and failed to act, while the Fall 2023 incident is relevant evidence of Powe’s continuing sexual predation – i.e., an alleged sexual assault (on another professionally subordinate woman) – perpetrated on Defendants’ premises during the interval in which Defendants hesitated to take action against Powe to protect their employees (and others), and after which Plaintiff was terminated, allegedly in retaliation for her “frustrating” exacerbation of his difficult situation.
As Plaintiff rightly asserts, evidence of both Powe’s alleged May 2023 unwelcome sexual advances toward Defendants’ employee and his alleged Fall 2023 sexual assault on his assistant on Defendants’ premises is relevant to, e.g., Plaintiff’s reasonable belief that Powe was engaged in sexual misconduct/predation and that Defendants engaged in an unlawful employment practice by permitting a sexually hostile work environment. See e.g., Docket No. 76 at 4; Docket No. 77 at 6. And although Defendants allege prejudice, they do so without explanation. Nor do they present argument/analysis that the probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusing/misleading the jury – a thing that, were there a showing of unfair prejudice, they would also be required to establish.
Accordingly, the court found that the challenged evidence would not be excluded on the grounds of relevance (Rule 401) or prejudice etc. (Rule 403).