In Barnes-Gray v. Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC, No. 2:23-CV-325-JEM, 2026 WL 591730 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
The methods for proving a retaliation claim are the same under both Title VII and § 1981. Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2007). To succeed, Barnes-Gray must show that she would not have been bumped from her position but for her protected activity. See Adusumilli v. City of Chi., 164 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that (s)he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that (s)he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is a causal link between the two.” Oliver v. Joint Logistics Managers, Inc., 893 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2018). “When the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, an employer may produce evidence which, if taken as true, would permit the conclusion that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action.” Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020). “If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff, to avoid summary judgment, then must produce evidence that would permit a trier of fact to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
NIPSCO acknowledges that Barnes-Gray’s reporting of the racially offensive comments is a protected activity. NIPSCO argues that Barnes-Gray suffered no adverse employment action, and that, even if the CBA-permitted bump is considered an adverse employment action, there is no causal link between it and her complaint. Barnes-Gray only addresses the retaliation argument by obliquely arguing that NIPSCO’s witnesses are not necessarily credible, but she does not explain how her assertions regarding their credibility apply to the retaliation claim.
Barnes-Gray did not suffer any loss of compensation, seniority, or other benefits of employment by being “bumped” by another employee and testified that she did not feel that she lost the respect of her co-workers. Poullard, 829 F.3d at 856 (“Federal law protects an employee only from retaliation that produces an injury.”). Barnes-Gray has not identified an actionable adverse employment action.
Based on this, the court held that summary judgment dismissing these claims was proper.