In Fagan v. Mount Vernon City School District et al, 7:25-cv-00927-VR, 2026 WL 851376 (SDNY March 27, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race/national origin claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
“In this Circuit, the sine qua non of a national origin or race-based discrimination suit is that the discrimination must be because of [the plaintiff’s protected characteristic],” meaning the protected characteristic was “a substantial or motivating factor contributing to the employer’s decision to take the action.” Buon, 65 F.4th at 82–83 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] plaintiff must allege that the employer took adverse action against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason, and she may do so by [either] alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 83 (citation omitted). Circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination include “the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges a series of actions and statements by his supervisors leading up to his transfer and ultimate termination that are just barely enough to plausibly create a “mosaic of intentional discrimination … that together give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As alleged, no action or verbal statement, standing alone, would suffice, but together they plausibly support a minimal inference of discriminatory bias. As alleged by Plaintiff, when he raised concerns about alleged misconduct of certain Black security officers, including his subordinate Anderson, his supervisors did not take his complaints seriously. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 46, 48, 64, 65). Instead, in a meeting in Defendant Pierce’s office, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pierce and Jones interrogated and laughed at him for raising the issue. (Id. ¶ 46). And when Plaintiff reported this mistreatment to Raimondi, the Acting Assistant Superintendent, he allegedly told Plaintiff to “let it go because he was not going to win because of his race.” (Id. ¶ 47). This statement explicitly refers to Plaintiff’s race as a reason to give up on his complaint, either against his supervisors or the Black security officers, supporting a minimal inference of discriminatory motive.
This inference is bolstered by the series of events that unfolded in the month of Plaintiff’s transfer and termination. As alleged by Plaintiff, in a phone call on October 4, 2023, Defendant Middleton (a member of the Board of Education) accused Plaintiff of being a racist, asking him, “Are you a racist?” (Id. ¶ 64). As part of the discussion, Plaintiff defended himself by explaining that certain Black security officers are calling him a racist for trying to hold them accountable for poor work performance and misrepresenting their work hours. (Id.). On October 18, 2023, Defendant Jones told Plaintiff that the Black security officers whom Plaintiff had reported for misconduct lodged a complaint against him. (Id. ¶ 61). Again, rather than taking Plaintiff’s complaints seriously, Defendant Jones allegedly asked Plaintiff why he picked on certain people and told him he reminded her of Donald Trump. (Id. ¶ 62). And when Plaintiff complained on October 18, 2023, about Barnes (one of the Black security officers he had earlier accused of misconduct) for telling Plaintiff, “Fuck you white mother fucker,” Raimondi again told Plaintiff to “let it go.” (Id. ¶ 65). Raimondi also allegedly told Plaintiff to leave Barnes and another Black security officer alone “because they had family members who were very close” to Defendant Middleton, a Board of Education Trustee. (Id. ¶ 67). Days later, Plaintiff was transferred to video monitoring and then terminated on October 23, 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 68–70).
Thus, Defendants’ racially inflected comments, combined with the sequence of events leading to Plaintiff’s transfer and termination, plausibly give rise to a minimal inference that either adverse employment action was motivated, at least in part, by racial bias.
Accordingly, the court held that dismissal was not warranted.