In Dominguez et al v. Mega Mart LLC d/b/a Chestnut Supermarket et al, No. 23-CV-1372 (EK)(PCG), 2026 WL 865824 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim of a race-based hostile work environment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
To plead a hostile work environment under Section 1981, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct is (1) objectively severe and pervasive, (2) creates an environment that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile and abusive, and (3) creates such an environment because of the plaintiff’s race. … The parties do not dispute the second element, so we address only the first and third.
Whether a particular work environment is objectively hostile is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry. A court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.
At this stage, the plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient. The complaint first alleges that defendants imposed an “English-only” policy on Hispanic employees. To be sure, the enforcement of an English-only policy, in and of itself, does not constitute a hostile work environment on the basis of race. Here, however, the complaint alleges that the English-only rule was “applied only to Hispanics,” suggesting that other employees were permitted to speak other languages. This allegation may be relatively sparse, given that the complaint does not identify those other employees or other languages. But it suggests hostility more plausibly when combined with the allegation that Epstein told plaintiffs speaking Spanish that he “hate[d] that shit.”
The hostile-work-environment allegations gain force from the claim that defendants segregated the Chestnut lunch hour, forcing Hispanic employees to eat in the basement while permitting non-Hispanic employees to eat in the store itself. Unsurprisingly, courts have consistently held that racially segregated workplace facilities will support a hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., Johnson v. Angels, 125 F. Supp. 3d 562, 569 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (racially segregated bathrooms); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (use of firehouse kitchen by racially segregated “supper club” of on-duty firefighters).
Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendants threatened Quintana, Crisantos, and Orduna with deportation “back to Mexico” on at least one occasion (April 5). These threats could have contributed to a work atmosphere permeated by fear and distrust between non-Hispanic employers and Hispanic employees.
(Cleaned up.)
Accordingly, the court concluded that “at this stage — taking the complaint as a whole — the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged racial harassment that would lead a reasonable employee to find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)