In Meyvi Concepcion Rivas Orantes v. D & J Export Inc. et al, No. 24-CV-08423-LDH-RML, 2026 WL 885231 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of quid pro quo sexual harassment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Here, Defendant Danny Salmeron engaged in unwanted sexual conduct toward Plaintiff, all of which she rejected. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-28, 30, 32-33.) Additionally, on December 28, 2023, five days after rejecting Defendant Danny Salmeron’s final sexual advance, Defendant Dany Salmeron “threatened and intimidated” a group of women, of which Plaintiff was a member, and, later that day, terminated Plaintiff’s employment at Defendant D & J Export.8 (Compl. ¶¶ 33-35.) Plaintiff contends that, by alleging that Defendant Danny Salmeron made sexual advances, which she rejected, she has demonstrated that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct and that her refusals “became the basis for tangible employment decisions—including, ultimately, her termination.”9 (Pl.’s Mem. L. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 14, ECF No. 18-4.) Not necessarily. While these allegations plainly demonstrate unwelcome sexual conduct, they fail to reflect that a tangible employment action occurred on the basis of Plaintiff’s refusal of Defendant Danny Salmeron’s sexual overtures.
It is true that “[a] close temporal proximity between [the rejection of sexual advances and the adverse employment action] ‘constitutes evidence of a causal connection.’ ” Harriram v. Fera, No. 21-CV-3696, 2024 WL 1020266, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024) (quoting Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2011)). Further, while the Second Circuit “has not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship,” Gorman–Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001), courts have found that, as here, a gap of less than two months between an unwanted sexual advance and a tangible employment action can support an inference of causation based on temporal proximity. Messer v. Fahnestock & Co. Inc., No. 103CV-04989, 2008 WL 4934608, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2008) (collecting cases). That said, the Second Circuit has, nonetheless, permitted courts to “exercise [their] judgment about the permissible inferences that can be drawn from temporal proximity in the context of particular cases.” Riddle v. Citigroup, 640 F. App’x 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (quoting Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009)).
In exercising its judgment, the Court finds that, despite the temporal proximity between her rejection of Defendant Danny Salmeron’s final sexual advance and the tangible employment action, that is, her termination, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate causality. That is, Plaintiff fails to allege a single fact evidencing a “link[ ]” between her termination and her rejection of Defendant Danny Salmeron’s “sexual overtures.” Bass, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (quoting Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778). Plaintiff, for example, does not allege that, following her final rejection of Defendant Danny Salmeron, Defendant Danny Salmeron “chastised” or “reprimanded” her, assigned her “unreasonably large quantities of work,” or changed his “demeanor” toward Plaintiff—that is, the manner in which he interacted with Plaintiff—in any way. Gibson v. Jacob K. Javits Convention Ctr. of New York, No. 95 CIV. 9728, 1998 WL 132796, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1998). Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any interaction between her, specifically, and Defendant Danny Salmeron between Plaintiff’s final rejection of his sexual advances and her termination. (See Compl.) Even more, as Defendants aptly note, Plaintiff concedes that, despite her refusal of Defendant Danny Salmeron’s repeated sexual solicitations, she remained employed at Defendant D & J Export for nearly six years. (See id. ¶ 19.) This fact fundamentally contradicts Plaintiff’s claims and, combined with the complete dearth of allegations supporting a quid pro quo harassment theory, makes plain that temporal proximity, alone, cannot “nudge [Plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Rather, the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s termination and her refusal of Defendant Danny Salmeron’s final sexual solicitation is mere coincidence.
Based on this, the court held that dismissal of plaintiff’s federal and state law claims was warranted.