In Deitrick v. Inwood Farms, LLC, No. 22-CV-9466 (LAP), 2026 WL 879158 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
This case illustrates the application of the “stray remarks” doctrine in employment discrimination cases. From the decision:
In determining whether a comment is probative of discriminatory intent or merely a “stray remark,” courts consider “(1) who made the remark (i.e., a decision-maker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker); (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark (i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory); and (4) the context in which the remark was made (i.e., whether it was related to the decision-making process).” Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). No single one of these factors is dispositive. …
The core of Plaintiff’s case turns on remarks allegedly made during his employment, including questions regarding whether Plaintiff was experiencing anxiety. (Pl. Dep. 187:18–189:9.) Plaintiff testified that Bosco and Ramos would “ask me if it was because of my anxiety” when he used the bathroom. (Id. 176:3-19 (“Q. What would they say? A. “ ‘Is this because of your anxiety disorder?’ ” Like what is going on [sic] I was like, ‘No, I just needed to use the bathroom.’ ”). Plaintiff also testified that he was “consistently questioned every time I went to the bathroom or was putting food away in the back or something[,] like that about where I was and why I was.” (Id. 174:11-15.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that Bosco would “time my trips to the bathroom and stand outside of the door occasionally.” (Id. 188:2-4). Plaintiff was then given the opportunity to describe any other incidents other than the bathroom questioning. (Id. 190:9-13, 17-21.) Plaintiff stated: “I don’t know; there were plenty of instances” and that he “[didn’t] know how to speculate that.” (Id. 190:15-16, 23-24).
Plaintiff fails to offer even an approximate time range for these comments, making it impossible to evaluate when the remarks were made in relation to his termination. But even accepting the frequency of the remarks, and that they were made by a supervisor, the context and content of these ambiguous remarks reveal little to no evidence of discriminatory intent. Wyeth Pharmecuticals, 616 F.3d at 149.
First, Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the context for these remarks undercuts any discriminatory inference. Plaintiff testified that when he was first hired, he orally informed Bosco and Ramos that he “had anxiety disorder.” (Pl. Dep. 21:22–22:21.) Plaintiff testified that Bosco told Plaintiff it was “brave of [him] to say that.” (Id.) Prior to abandoning his reasonable accommodation claim, Plaintiff also testified that he requested an accommodation for his anxiety by telling Bosco and Ramos that “if I feel a panic attack coming on I would let them know.” (Id. 25:14-16.) In seeking an accommodation, Plaintiff thus invited the very questions regarding his anxiety and well-being that he now contends are discriminatory.
Moreover, the content of the remarks—questions about whether Plaintiff was absent because of his anxiety—is neither inherently derogatory nor otherwise indicative of bias. Plaintiff himself conceded that he “can’t speculate” whether the remarks reflected legitimate concern for his well-being or animus towards his anxiety.
The court further held that no reasonable inference of discrimination could be drawn from the alleged comment, at plaintiff’s exit interview, that “maybe this is because of your anxiety,” noting that this was likely a reference to plaintiff’s “attendance issues and workplace misconduct,” as opposed to the decision to terminate plaintiff.