Title VII Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claim Survives Dismissal; Racial Harassment Allegations Deemed Pertinent to Pervasiveness

In Claybrook v. Freightliner of Arizona, LLC et al, No. 3:25-CV-00633, 2026 WL 1195852 (M.D. Tenn. May 1, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

From the decision:

To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, the sexual harassment must have been sufficiently “severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Bruce, 168 F.4th at 377 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). See also id. (“[O]ur caselaw is clear that ‘ “severe or pervasive” is properly considered in the disjunctive.’ ” (quoting Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 514 (6th Cir. 2009))). To determine whether alleged conduct was pervasive or severe, the court considers “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Roseman v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., No. 20-2151, 2021 WL 4931959, at *3 (6th Cir. July 14, 2021) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Because the SAC alleges sufficient facts from which the court can reasonably infer that the alleged conduct was pervasive, the court does not address whether the alleged conduct was severe.

Because the SAC alleges only two instances of sexual harassment, Freightliner argues that the alleged conduct was not pervasive. (Doc. No. 23 at 9–14.) Claybrook responds that Freightliner incorrectly argues that the sexual harassment alone must be sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim, while in fact the court must consider the totality of circumstances, including the alleged racial harassment. (Doc. No. 26 at 7–9 (citing Williams, 187 F.3d at 563–66.) Freightliner does not respond to this argument, other than to state that the plaintiff impermissibly “tried to support the severe/pervasive requirement by including non-sexual harassment allegations.” (Doc. No. 31 at 4 & n.1.)

In Williams, the Sixth Circuit found that the lower court had improperly “categorized the harassment by the type of harassing action when determining the existence of a hostile environment.” 187 F.3d at 361 n.3. The court noted that the district court had impermissibly “disaggregated” incidents of sexual harassment, “divorcing them from their context and depriving them of their full force.” 187 F.3d at 561–62. Williams, however, concerned only the disaggregation of categories of sexual harassment. But the principle holds in some cases for aggregating sexual and other kinds of harassment to support an argument for pervasiveness, especially where, as here, the plaintiff alleges that they are non-separable. Accord Wade v. Automation Pers. Servs., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-375, 2014 WL 11515694, at *8 n.3 (E.D. Tenn. July 7, 2014) (“Williams … only deals with one protected characteristic ….However, the essence of Wade’s argument—that each individual type of harassment should not be considered in isolation— is well taken.”), aff’d, 612 F. App’x 291 (6th Cir. 2015).

The Sixth Circuit has addressed this issue, noting that “race and sex[ ] are protected by Title VII,” that “[t]hese characteristics do not exist in isolation,” and that “Title VII does not permit plaintiffs to fall between two stools when their claim rests on multiple protected grounds.” Shazor v. Pro. Transit Mgmt, Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 958 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 514–15 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff could rely on evidence of religious harassment to buttress his claim for racial harassment); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence of racial harassment could be considered in a claim for a sexually hostile work environment)). While the plaintiff’s argument could have been clearer, his allusion to this line of cases is particularly salient here, where Freightliner does not address the alleged racial harassment in its argument regarding pervasiveness, and where the SAC makes explicit that the alleged multiple forms of harassment were “intertwined.” (SAC ¶ 47.)