In Terrell v. UVA Health System, No. 3:26-CV-00036, 2026 WL 1122379 (W.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2026), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
From the decision:
An employer contravenes these anti-discrimination statutes by requiring an employee to work in an environment that is hostile to her gender, age or disability. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986). To succeed on a hostile-work-environment claim a plaintiff must show that there is: “(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s … [sex, age, or disability]; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer.” McIver v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc., 42 F.4th 398, 407 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Okoli v. City of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011)). This type of claim fails unless “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Brackney-Wheelock v. City of Charlottesville, 652 F. Supp. 3d 603, 628 (W.D. Va. 2023) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
The severe or pervasive conduct giving rise to an abusive work environment must be objectively and subjectively “hostile” and “abusive.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. Courts look to “all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277. The ultimate inquiry, though, is whether the conduct is so “extreme” as to “amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
Terrell’s allegations—which include that her performance was criticized by her supervisor—are not even obviously discriminatory, much less the type of severe and abusive discrimination that constitutes a hostile work environment. Her allegations stand in sharp contrast to the allegations in Okoli and Spriggs, which the Fourth Circuit found to be sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. See Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220 (plaintiff “present[ed] a strong claim for hostile work environment” where, in four months, she experienced (1) disparaging jokes about gays and lesbians; (2) comments about herself and a Jacuzzi fantasy; (3) comments about herself and group sex fantasy; (4) questions about her underwear; (5) comments about sexual relations with another African-American woman; (6) additional inquiries about her sitting on a lap and Jacuzzi fantasy; (7-10) several incidents of fondling her leg under a table; (11) forcible kissing; and (12) more propositions to join in a Jacuzzi fantasy); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 182-84 (4th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff demonstrated harassment was severe and pervasive where he was exposed on a “continuous daily” basis to blatantly racist slurs).
Accordingly, the court dismissed these claims.