In Rivkind v. Oracle America, Inc., No. CV 25-172, 2026 WL 1082138 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Count III asserts a sex-based hostile work environment claim under Title VII. A hostile work environment claim requires allegations that: (1) the plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination because of sex; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) a basis exists for employer liability. Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167. “For discrimination to constitute severe or pervasive behavior, it must ‘alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
Rivkind alleges she was the only woman on her team and that Oracle targeted and belittled her, gave her fewer opportunities than male coworkers, and subjected her to bullying and censorship. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-30, 55-56. Those allegations do not plausibly plead harassment that was severe or pervasive because of sex. The Amended Complaint identifies no sex-based comments, ridicule, or repeated conduct from which the Court can reasonably infer that the challenged conduct was tied to Rivkind’s sex rather than to the broader workplace conflict described in the pleading. Rather, Rivkind alleges in a conclusory manner that she was “targeted” and “belittled.” The Court previously warned in the December 30, 2025 order that conclusory allegations would not suffice.
(Cleaned up.)
The court concluded that, on this amended pleading, Count III still falls short, and thus dismissed that count with prejudice.