In Hernandez v. Bisbee Unified Sch. Dist. #2, et al., No. CV-25-00475-TUC-RM (BGM), 2026 WL 1256136 (D. Ariz. May 7, 2026), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff stated a plausible national origin discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Defendants next assert that Plaintiff’s national origin discrimination claim should be dismissed because (i) she fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (ii) the positions for which she applied fall outside of a two-year statute of limitations; (iii) she fails to demonstrate others outside of her class were treated more favorably; and (iv) she fails to demonstrate she was qualified for the positions sought. (Doc. 17 at 6-7.) The Court finds that Plaintiff need not establish a prima facie discrimination case at the pleading stage, her discrimination claim is premised upon incidents that fall within a 300-day exhaustion period, and that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to infer that she suffered adverse employment action because of her national origin.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [her] … national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “Failure to promote is a common manifestation of disparate treatment” under Title VII, McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004), as is failure to hire, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). “[T]he plaintiff in a disparate treatment case must show the employer’s intent to discriminate, but intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). One way to establish an inference of discrimination is by satisfying the prima facie elements from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 690 (9th Cir. 2017).
To state a prima facie disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege she: “(1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside h[er] protected class were treated more favorably or that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer.” Belt v. Andrew Rees – Crocs, Inc., 2024 WL 1638548, at *5 (D. Nev. Apr. 15, 2024) (citing Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 690-91). Alternatively, under Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading standard, the plaintiff’s complaint must include “sufficient, nonconclusory allegations plausibly linking the [adverse employment] action to discrimination on the basis of [national origin].” Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff alleges that: (i) she is a female of Hispanic descent, (Doc. 12, ¶ 1); (ii) she was qualified for six different District positions to which she applied, (id., ¶ 16); (iii) she was denied the positions, (id., ¶¶ 16, 19-21, 23-25); and (iv) individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably, (id., ¶¶ 19-21, 23, 25).3 These allegations are sufficient to raise Plaintiff’s right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that her allegations are true. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (instructing that to survive a motion to dismiss, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.”). Plaintiff also correctly names the District as Defendant, as “[a] suit against a school [administrator] in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the school district.” Williams v. Alhambra Sch. Dist. No. 68, 234 F. Supp. 3d 971, 978 (D. Ariz. 2017); see also Ortez v. Wash. Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[E]mployees cannot be held liable in their individual capacities under Title VII.”).
(Cleaned up.)
Accordingly, dismissal was not warranted.