In Watkins v. Wesley Homes, No. 2:25-CV-00290-LK, 2026 WL 1649579 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.
To succeed on her hostile work environment claim, Watkins is required to establish that:
(1) she was subjected to a hostile work environment, and (2) Wesley Homes is liable for the harassment that caused the hostile environment to exist. Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, 18 F.4th 643, 647 (9th Cir. 2021). To meet the first element, she must show: (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual or racial nature; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) “the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. (citing Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.” (citation modified)). “To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive,” courts examine “all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). “[O]ffhand comments[ ] and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment[.]” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
As with her original complaint, Watkins’s amended complaint fails to allege conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment. Much of the amended complaint “offers ‘labels and conclusions’ [and] ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action [that] will not do.’ ” Iqbal, 556 at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Watkins alleges that she was “directed by email” to report to her supervisor’s office “regarding the funeral,” had a request for the Executive Director’s attendance at the meeting (as permitted by the employee handbook) denied, and was threatened to be labeled as insubordinate or with termination if she “did not meet alone and agree to be ‘trained’ and sign a write-up.” Dkt. No. 33 at 2. She alleges that there was “[a] witness…present…during part of the meeting.” Id.
These allegations are not frequent or severe enough to constitute a hostile work environment. Taken together, Watkins’s allegations identify one meeting in which her supervisor said she needed training and that failure to comply would result in termination. Id. at 2–3. Watkins suggests that this meeting failed to comply with Wesley Home’s “progressive discipline” policy, but that appears inconsistent with the fact that she was specifically not terminated at this meeting. Id. at 2. And in any event, “the mere threat of termination does not constitute an adverse employment action.” Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App’x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, considering “all the circumstances,” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642, including that there was “[a] witness…present…during part of the meeting,” Dkt. No. 33 at 2, it does not appear that the Executive Director’s absence from the meeting elevated the circumstances to the level of a hostile work environment.
Watkins’s allegations do not constitute “physically threatening or humiliating” conduct, nor do they demonstrate an “unreasonabl[e] interfere[nce] with…work performance.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. At most, her allegations appear to demonstrate “isolated incidents” that do not amount to “discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment[.]” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Therefore, the Court dismisses Watkins’s hostile work environment claim.
Based on this, the court held that dismissal was warranted.