In Glazman v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 8:26-CV-1522-TPB-AEP, 2026 WL 2253820 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2026), an employment discrimination case, the court, inter alia, held that the arbitration agreement in question was enforceable, and that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (“EFAA”) did not preclude its enforcement.
The central issue in this case was whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged a sexual harassment claim under the relevant statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint does not plausibly state a claim for sexual harassment that would survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Courts recognize two kinds of sexual harassment claims under Title VII and the FCRA. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986). One such claim is quid pro quo sexual harassment, in which a supervisor uses the threat or promise of employment-related actions to extract sexual favors from the employee. Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff does not attempt to allege this type of harassment.
A second type of sexual harassment claim is based on the creation of a hostile work environment. A hostile work environment is not created by such matters as discrimination in compensation or assignments. It requires a work environment “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” See Tonkyro v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 836-37 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted); Usai v. Club Mgmt. Miami II, LLC, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2025) (explaining that the Eleventh Circuit has noted that “all of the sexual hostile environment cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved patterns or allegations of extensive, long lasting, unaddressed, and uninhibited sexual threats or conduct that permeated the plaintiffs’ work environment”); Waiguchu v. Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, No. 1:25-cv-7443-GHW, 2026 WL 892069, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2026) (holding that “the drafters of the EFAA did not extend its protection to all categories of gender-based discrimination” and that “allegations of differential treatment and microaggressions…are not conduct constituting ‘sexual harassment’ under the EFAA”).
Plaintiff’s complaint includes a count titled “Hostile Work Environment Based on Sex” and a conclusory allegation that the conduct alleged in the complaint was “sufficiently pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment and to create a working environment that unreasonably interfered with [her] ability to perform her core responsibilities.” While these conclusory allegations borrow some of the language courts have used to describe a hostile work environment, nowhere in the “Hostile Work Environment” count or anywhere else in the complaint are there any allegations plausibly suggesting a sexual harassment claim under the standards set forth above. Plaintiff alleges facts showing at most discriminatory unequal pay and assignments, pointing to “three documented occasions” within a nine-month period that occurred, including displacement of her work, deadline pressure, and unequal assignment structure between her and her male coworkers.
The court concluded that “[t]hese allegations do not statute a plausible hostile work environment claim, and therefore the EFAA does not preclude enforcement of the arbitration agreement.”