In Lane v. Salesforce, Inc., No. 25-CV-9707 (DEH) (HJR), 2026 WL 2364630, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2026), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law – thus failing to trigger the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”).
Initially, the court assessed whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged sexual harassment under the NYCHRL (which imposes the most lenient liability standard).
After surveying the legal landscape and assuming (without deciding) that the correct standard for determining whether a NYCHRL claim triggers application of the EFAA is that set forth in the case of Owens v. PriceWaterHouseCoopers LLC, 786 F. Supp. 3d 831, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 2025), the court concluded that plaintiff’s complaint failed to meet that standard, since while her complaint alleges instance of differential treatment based on gender, it fails to plausibly plead sexual harassment.
From the decision:
Plaintiff’s factual allegations fall short of alleging sexual harassment. Lane does not allege any shouting or yelling; she instead claims that she was criticized. Nor does she allege demeaning conduct or use of gendered terms. Further, Lane’s allegations that Temple did not support her and excluded her from business communications and decisions are similar to allegations that constituted gender-based discrimination but not sexual harassment—including that supervisors were less friendly and less communicative with the plaintiff than with her male colleagues. Here, Lane’s allegations may describe differential treatment, but fail to describe unwelcome verbal or physical behavior based on Lane’s gender thereby constituting sexual harassment. Therefore, these claims under the NYCHRL do not trigger application of the EFAA.
(Citations, internal quotation marks, and internal bracketing omitted; cleaned up.)
Accordingly, the court granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the case.