In Rachana Chandra Sekara Reddy v. Genpact LLC et al, No. 2:25-CV-02138-DAD-JDP, 2026 WL 2529764 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026), the court denied defendant’s motion to compel Arbitration of plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim, on the ground that the Ending Forced Arbitration Act (“EFAA”) applied.[1]Here, plaintiff asserted her claims under California state law; the author of this blog post is not admitted to practice law in California and nothing contained herein should be construed as practicing, or rendering advice under, California law.
From the decision:
Here, plaintiff has alleged that defendants took multiple official employment actions and in opposition to the pending motion she credibly argues that these actions together communicated “a widespread, demeaning message to [p]laintiff that female employees who are pregnant are not wanted in the workplace at Genpact.” (Doc. No. 13 at 8.) The undersigned has previously found that the EFAA applies where the plaintiff pleads “nonfrivolous claims relating to sexual assault or to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment, with the sufficiency of those claims to be reserved for proper merits adjudication.” Cardenas v. F.D. Thomas, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-01814-DAD-JDP, 2025 WL 418753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2025) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to weigh in on whether the appropriate inquiry is whether a plaintiff has asserted a nonfrivolous claim of sexual assault or sexual harassment. See Combs v. Netflix, Inc., 180 F.4th 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 2026) (“To determine whether the EFAA covers a plaintiff’s claims, we first consider whether the allegations in the complaint sound in sexual harassment or sexual assault. Here, there is no question that the complaint alleges conduct constituting unlawful sexual harassment. Combs’s claims therefore presumptively fall within the EFAA, and, absent anything further, she could elect to proceed in court rather than through arbitration.”). Therefore, this court will continue to apply the “nonfrivolous” standard that it adopted in Cardenas.
Here, the court finds that plaintiff has pled “nonfrivolous claims relating … to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment,” as is required in order for the EFAA to apply.1 Cardenas, 2025 WL 418753, at *3.; see also Solis v. Prime Comms Retail, LLC, No. 5:24-cv-02389-AH-SHK, 2025 WL 1255143, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2025) (finding that allegations of official employment actions such as denying accommodations, scheduling shifts, and transferring the plaintiff from one store to another “amount to nonfrivolous claims of sexual harassment” for purposes of the EFAA); Landucci v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 5:14-cv-00789-LHK, 2014 WL 3705117, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2014) (“Here, Plaintiff argues … that Colker’s supervisory actions with respect to Plaintiff had the secondary effect of communicating his hostile message that females are not valued. Construing the Complaint in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes Plaintiffs’ allegations at least colorably allege that Colker, by excessively monitoring, micromanaging, and criticizing Plaintiff but not her male co-workers, engaged in discriminatory actions based on her gender in order to send a message to the work force that female employees were not valued.”).
The court concluded that “[h]aving determined that the EFAA applies here, the court concludes that plaintiff may not be compelled to arbitrate this case,” warranting the denial of defendants’ motion.
| ↩1 | Here, plaintiff asserted her claims under California state law; the author of this blog post is not admitted to practice law in California and nothing contained herein should be construed as practicing, or rendering advice under, California law. |
|---|