In Ballas v. Equis Research, No. 5:26-CV-01759-JMG, 2026 WL 2491776 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
A plaintiff may bring a hostile work environment claim under Section 1981, “reasoning that such an environment can amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” See Poteat v. CP Dev., No. 24-3290, 2026 WL 93129, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (citation modified) (quoting Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2017)). To state such a claim, Plaintiff must show: “(1) intentional discrimination because of the plaintiff’s race that (2) was severe or pervasive and that both (3) detrimentally affected the plaintiff and (4) would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, as well as (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” See id. (citation modified) (quoting Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 263–64). The Court will focus on severity or pervasiveness, as that is the element Defendant challenges.
The distinction between severe and pervasive “means that severity and pervasiveness are alternative possibilities: some harassment may be severe enough to contaminate an environment even if not pervasive; other, less objectionable, conduct will contaminate the workplace only if it is pervasive.” Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264 (citation modified). The Court must consider the “totality of the circumstances, including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)) (observing a supervisor using the n-word one time can be sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim). “Determining whether harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive is a highly fact-intensive inquiry,” so “courts have shown a reluctance to dismiss a complaint at the motion to dismiss stage” based on severity and/or pervasiveness alone. Ingram v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-3674, 2015 WL 4394274, at *19 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2015) (citation modified) (first quoting Long v. Pizza Hut (Store # 635008), No 03–0738, 2003 WL 23019186, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov.5, 2003); and then quoting Grasty v. World Flavors, Inc., Civ. No. 11–1778, 2011 WL 3515864, at *9 n. 2 (E.D. Pa. Aug.11, 2011)); see also Caldwell v. Nodiff, No. CIV.A. 13-162, 2014 WL 641356, at *7 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2014) (same).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficiently severe or pervasive. See Def.’s Mem. in Supp., at 14-15. But in support of that argument, Defendant cites all summary judgment opinions. See id. (citing Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2023); Saidu-Kamara v. Parkway Corp., 155 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Morales-Evans v. Admin Off. of the Cts. of the State of N.J., 102 F. Supp. 2d 577 (D. N.J. 2000); Szyper v. Am. Med. Response Mid-Atlantic, Inc., No. 20-4642, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230583, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2021)). That is not helpful in determining whether Plaintiff’s claim should survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff argues that her hostile work environment claim should survive a motion to dismiss, as the plaintiff’s claim survived in De Piero v. Pennsylvania State University, 711 F. Supp. 3d 410, 422 (E.D. Pa. 2024). In De Piero, the Court recognized a viable hostile work environment claim where race-conscious trainings and administrative communications crossed the line into pervasive racial hostility. There, the plaintiff attended five trainings that “ascrib[ed] negative traits to [W]hite people or [W]hite teachers without exception and as flowing inevitably from their race.” See id. at 423. Those trainings included an exercise where the Assistant Vice Provost for Educational Equity instructed non-Black faculty to “feel the pain” during a breathing exercise, the plaintiff’s supervisor used “supposed examples of racist comments where every hypothetical perpetrator was [W]hite,” and that same supervisor endorsed an event where the “facilitator condemned [W]hite people for no other reason than they spoke or were simply present.” See id. at 423 (citation modified). The plaintiff alleged other incidents, including, but not limited to, receiving “multiple emails urging him to watch a video titled White Teachers Are a Problem” and the Director of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion “calling on [W]hite people to feel terrible[ ] about their own internalized white supremacy.” See id. at 416, 423 (citation modified). When the plaintiff expressed concerns to the Associate Director of the Affirmative Action Office, she told the plaintiff that “there is a problem with the [W]hite race,” he “simply did not get it,” and he “should continue to attend more workshops and trainings until the message sunk in.” See id. at 423.6
While Plaintiff’s allegations are not as extensive as those in De Piero, she nonetheless pleads a widespread, workplace-wide pattern of race-based animus. Plaintiff alleges that multiple people have voiced concerns to an external investigator about racial preferences. See Compl. ¶ 13. The investigator documented that Defendant’s leadership was “not crazy about [W]hite people around” there.7 See id. ¶ 12. Employee surveys echoed these concerns, including calls to “stop hiring [W]hite people.” See id. ¶ 14. These institutional attitudes manifested in specific personnel decisions, including a peer evaluation referencing an employee’s “[W]hite privilege,” and rejecting a qualified White candidate because she was “older and [W]hite.” See id. ¶ 16. Those attitudes extended to Plaintiff personally by making her feel like she does not belong and being excluded from a diversity webinar that was designed to “decenter whiteness” and meant for “practitioners of color”—”not for [W]hite folks.” See id. ¶¶ 17-18. And when she reported the incident to her supervisor, that supervisor failed to take corrective action. See id. ¶¶ 20-21.
Though “offhand comments and isolated incidents” are generally insufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment, see Sharpe v. Primex Garden Ctr., No. CV 23-4843, 2024 WL 3161755, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Watkins v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 2023 WL 5925896, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2023) (not precedential)), Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, demonstrate an environment where racial hostility was institutionalized, pervasive, and endorsed by leadership.
Based on this, the court held that denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Section 1981 hostile work environment claim.