In Hardmon v. SNF Mor LLC d/b/a Avardis Health et al, No. 4:25-CV-203-DMB-JMV, 2026 WL 2970552 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In sum, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated after reporting what she believed to be sexual harassment. While the court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for sexual harassment, her retaliation claim survived:
The defendants argue that “[Hardmon’s] allegations … do not show that she engaged in protected activity since she could not have reasonably believed that she was reporting conduct prohibited by Title VII.” Doc. #19 at 9.
Hardmon responds that “[a]ny reasonable person in [her] position would believe that reporting the top administrator for discussing his high sex drive, interrogating her about white men and infidelity, staring at her lips, licking his own lips, and attempting to physically isolate her behind his desk constituted opposing unlawful conduct;” “a lay employee is not required to perform a complex legal analysis of severe or pervasive jurisprudence before reporting a predatory boss to Human Resources;” and “[n]o reasonable person could possibly hear a corporate HR representative confirm that supervisor is a protected sexual predator and conclude that Title VII is not implicated.” Doc. #25 at 12.
The defendants reply that “[Hardmon] mischaracterizes [their] arguments” and that “[w]hat [they] argued was that [she] could not establish that she actually engaged in protected activity unless she reported activity that one would objectively reasonably believe to be a violation of Title VII.” Doc. #36 at 5.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in activity protected under the statute, (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 134 F.4th 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Feist v. La. Dep’t of Just., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013).
Here, the parties dispute whether Hardmon engaged in protected activity. “Protected activity is defined as opposition to any practice rendered unlawful by Title VII, including making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII.” Id. (quoting Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003). “[A] plaintiff need not demonstrate that the practice was actually unlawful for his opposition to be a protected activity; rather, it is enough that the plaintiff reasonably believed the practice was unlawful.” Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc., 16 F.4th 1204, 1210 (5th Cir. 2021). “When examining whether an employee’s belief that his employer engaged in an unlawful act was reasonable, a court must ask whether a person, ‘not instructed on Title VII law as a jury would be, [could] reasonably believe that she was providing information about a Title VII violation.” Id. at 1211 (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 2016)). “This inquiry is informed by the nature of the statement forming the base of the alleged discrimination, whether the statement was directed at a particular person or group of persons, whether it came from a person with supervisory authority, and the setting where the employee’s complaint was voiced.” Id.
The court concluded by noting that plaintiff alleges that she reported the conduct to human resources for sexual harassment, and since sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII and plaintiff “reasonably believed she was reporting a Title VII violation, she engaged in protected activity and her retaliation claim will not be dismissed.”