In Balchan v. New Rochelle City School District, 23-CV-06202 (PMH), 2024 WL 2058726 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of religious discrimination asserted under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Title VII defines religion capaciously to include all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief. Gardner-Alfred v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 651 F. Supp. 3d 695, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). The inquiry as to whether a person’s belief is religious is twofold: ‘whether the beliefs professed by a [claimant] are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious. [C]ourts have a limited function in determining whether religious beliefs are protected.
Here, the First Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff, an Ashkenazi Jewish woman, observes the Days of Awe, “during which time Jews meditate on the subject of the holidays …,” and that her marriage resulted in her “meld[ing] many of her Jewish religious beliefs into her new Trinidadian identity.” Therefore, because Plaintiff’s “personal scheme of things religious required that she take personal leave during [the Days of Awe] to adjust, meditate, repair her connection to [God], and re-focus,” she planned a family trip to Trinidad and Tobago that had “significant spiritual and religious significance.” Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly pled that she held a sincere religious belief requiring her to take leave during the Days of Awe. See Gardner-Alfred, 651 F. Supp. 3d at 721 (“The first requirement (i.e., sincerity of a person’s religious belief) is a question of fact—unsuitable to resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s taking leave to travel to her religious retreat in Trinidad and Tobago necessarily conflicted with her requirement to be present at work.
Defendants further argue that factual findings in the Report are entitled to preclusive effect in this action and demonstrate that Plaintiff’s trip was not religious in nature. Plaintiff argues that the factual findings are not probative and not entitled to preclusive effect because, inter alia, she did not have the opportunity to fully litigate the issues at the Section 75 hearing. However, even assuming arguendo that the factual findings that Defendants rely on are entitled to preclusive effect, the Court’s conclusion would not change. For instance, Defendants cite to the Hearing Officer’s findings about what activities Plaintiff did on her trip (i.e. kayaking, horseback riding, drinking alcoholic beverages, etc.). Plaintiff does not specifically address these findings nor argue facts to the contrary. … Rather, Plaintiff maintains that she was required to take leave to reflect and meditate and that the issue of whether she lied regarding the nature of her leave is a question of fact. Here, the fact that Plaintiff spent time on these non-religious activities during her trip does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that she spent time meditating for religious purposes. Accordingly, accepting these findings as true does not warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s discrimination claims.7
Defendants also cite to the Hearing Officer’s finding that “Plaintiff did not engage in any religious observance or obligation during her trip to Tobago.” (Def. Br. at 24). The Court will not dispose of Plaintiff’s discrimination claims based on this broad factual conclusion, especially given that the alleged method of religious observance was in the form of meditation and reflection. Nor will the Court give preclusive effect to the Hearing Officer’s findings about the truth or falsity of Plaintiff’s allegations. (Def. Br. at 24 (see e.g. “H.O. Bernstein made a factual finding that Plaintiff’s allegation that she traveled to Tobago for religious purposes was false”)). Those findings represent the Hearing Officer’s ultimate conclusions based on facts gathered during the hearing and are not properly categorized as “factual” findings. The issue before the Hearing Officer was different than the issues before this Court.
With respect to the disclosure element, Plaintiff’s initial leave request specified that leave was being taken for “religious observance” during “pre-planned travel abroad.” When questioned about the nature of her trip, Plaintiff identified the Jewish high holidays of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur and stated that it was a “sacred” time for her. Plaintiff also allegedly “provided the explicit rationale for the religious importance of her personal leave request” at the October 7, 2022 meeting. Defendants rely on an audio recording of the October 7 meeting and a transcript of that recording to argue that Plaintiff did not provide any rationale for her travel requirement. The Court declines to consider the audio recording or transcript on this motion as they are mostly inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she disclosed her religious belief to Defendants.
Finally, Plaintiff has clearly alleged that she was disciplined for exercising her religious beliefs. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Board terminated her for utilizing her contractual personal leave days to observe the high holy Jewish holidays of the Days of Awe, Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur.
[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]
Based on this, the court held that, at this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly pled religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII.