In Mazzuchelli v. Immutable Pty. Ltd and Lightsource Global, 23-cv-7885 (NSR), 2024 WL 4817535 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2024), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s pregnancy discrimination claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
To state a claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he is within a protected group; (2) he was qualified for the job at issue; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) this action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Dickens v. Hudson Sheraton Corp., LLC, 167 F. Supp. 3d 499, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d, 689 F. App’x 670 (2d Cir. 2017). To state a claim for discrimination under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must allege “merely ‘that she has been treated less well than other employees because of her gender.’ ” Luzunaris v. Baly Cleaning Servs., No. 23-CV-11137 (GHW) (RFT), 2024 WL 3926S708 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Luzunaris v. Baly Cleaning Servs. Inc., No. 1:23-CV-11137-GHW-RFT, 2024 WL 3925919 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2024) (quoting Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013)). The “four elements of a prima facie case for employment discrimination are: (i) that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (ii) that Plaintiff was qualified for her position; (iii) that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent.” Id. at *6. The “standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under section 296 of the Human Rights Law are the same as those governing title VII.” Mittl v. New York State Div. of Hum. Rts., 794 N.E.2d 660, 663 (2003).
Plaintiff is able to satisfy the elements needed to state an employment discrimination claim under Title VII and NYSHRL: Plaintiff is female and pregnant, thus within a protected group (see Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that Plaintiff who was female and pregnant was thereby a member of a protected class); see also Flores v. Buy Buy Baby, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same)) (prong 1); Plaintiff was qualified for the job at issue (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-18, 64, 70-71) (prong 2); Plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action in being terminated (see Am. Compl. ¶ 65) (prong 3); and the circumstances surrounding the adverse action evidence a discriminatory intent (prong 4). Specifically, Plaintiff was fired “less than a month after disclosing her pregnancy to Anderson and only ten days after complaining about discrimination.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 65.) Courts have held that such close proximity between disclosure of a pregnancy and termination gives rise to an inference of discriminatory circumstances. See Krause v. Lancer & Loader Grp., LLC, 965 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (inference of discrimination raised where plaintiff was fired shortly after informing supervisor she was pregnant). Additionally, that Anderson made disparaging comments questioning whether Plaintiff could effectuate her responsibilities while pregnant and then that same day gave Plaintiff a negative performance review (the only time Plaintiff received such a review) further evidences that the adverse action was undergirded by discriminatory intent. Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that bosses’ expressed concern about plaintiff’s pregnancy and hormones gave rise to inference of discrimination surrounding plaintiff’s termination).
Based on this, the court found that plaintiff stated plausible Title VII and NYSHRL discrimination claims, and thus denied defendant’s motion to dismiss such claims.