In Modny et al v. Foley Hoag LLP et al, 24-CV-5586 (JMF), 2025 WL 487308 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s national origin discrimination claims.
From the decision:
[T]he Court rejects the Moving Defendants’ challenge to Modny’s national origin disparate treatment claim under Title VII, the NYCHRL, and the NYSHRL. The Moving Defendants fault Modny for alleging their adverse actions were “based on retaliatory animus, not discriminatory animus.” Defs.’ Mem. 5. But generally, “[a]ny inquiry into any [alternative] reasons for a defendant’s conduct is reserved for summary judgment or trial.” Levy, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 216. The Moving Defendants expressly concede that “Modny alleges … various adverse employment actions,” Defs.’ Mem. 3, and that he alleges that two superiors made repeated “offensive remarks about Russians,” id. at 4-5, or about him in relation to his Russian heritage, see ECF No. 29 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 53, 68, 87, 92. Modny also alleges that he was prohibited from applying for a promotion for which he “was effectively already preforming [sic] many of the duties,” id. ¶ 97, and that a non-Russian person “with significantly less experience” was hired instead, id. ¶ 99. Taken together, these allegations suffice to create a “minimal inference” of discriminatory motivation. See, e.g., Santiago v. ACACIA Network, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 3d 143, 155 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Pothen v. Stony Brook Univ., 211 F. Supp. 3d 486, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
The court also, among other things, denied defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims, as well as his aiding and abetting claims against individual defendants.